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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary A Hairs by the Editor
The A m erican Dream in Black and White
Of the many depressing aspects of American political
life, none is more dispiriting than the state of our racial
politics. The signs of p:>larization are everywhere. President Reagan , who currently enjoys high approval ratings among whites, has next to no support in the Black
community. Black Republicans are about as plentiful
as Zionist Arabs. By itself, racial division along partisan
lines need not dismay us unduly ; ethnicity and race
have long served as fault lines in American politics. But
behind politics lies ideology, and contemporary disputes over racial issues-as in the continuing controversy over the composition and program of the U.S.
Civil Rights Commission-reveal differences between
the contending parties so profound that they scarcely
occupy the same universe of discourse.
In specific terms, the dispute involves tlie use of
quotas: shall Blacks and other specified minorities be
guaranteed a certain number of places where scarce
educational and occupational resources are at stake, or
should those desired positions be allocated according
to strictly meritocratic and color-blind proce<;lures?
Does the idea of civil rights involve equal opportunity
alone, as has traditionally been supposed, or does it now
require at least some measure of guaranteed equality of
results? The argument concerning quotas would be intense and divisive enough standing on its own, but behind it lie fundamental disagreements about American
social groundrules, American values-about, indeed,
the very meaning of the American Dream.
The notion of the "American Dream" is by now so
hackneyed and encrusted with conventional rhetoric
that it is easy to dismiss it as meaningless. Yet it has
played an extraordinary role in national self-understanding, and there is reason to believe that it has not
yet played itself out.
The original idea behind it was simple: it promised
that in America, to a degree surpassed nowhere else, a
person could advance as far as his ability, effort, and
luck carried him, and it decreed that his possibilities
would not be artificially restricted by attributes of ancestry, class, or religion. While never fully implemented, it nonetheless expressed the nation's moral
ideal, its sense of its special identity. Americans were to
stand equal before the law and equal in their opportunity to compete for desired public goods; they were
to be considered and accorded rights as individuals,
·not as members of racial, ethnic, or other groups. The
American Dream never guaranteed upward mobility,
April, 1984

but it did assume it as a realistic hope for those able and
willing to put forth the necessary effort.
And the Dream worked. If Americans did not often,
in the style of Horatio Alger, rise from rags to riches ,
they did regularly proceed, in historian Stephan Themstrom's. phrase, "from rags to respectability." Studies of
social and economic mobility in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries have demonstrated that the vision
of improving one's condition in life continually became
reality for millions of ordinary Americans, including
those from suspect or even despised minority groups.
Americans have always tended to be intensely patriotic,
and their nationalism has most obviously traced its
roots to the simple fact that, for most of the people most
of the time, the American system worked. The land of
opportunity turned out to be just that for masses of those
who elsewhere often found their paths to improvement
blocked or seriously impeded.
It was all true-except, of course, for Black people.
The same studies that record the upward progress of
members of virtually all other ethnic groups (if at differing rates) reveal that Black Americans advanced hardly
at all, at least until the 1940s. After that things got better,
but at an agonizingly slow rate. And no reasonable observer could attribute the Blacks' problems to anything
other than a massive system of legal and customary discrimination. Blacks lagged behind because whites would
not allow them to move ahead. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 60s tried to remedy the situation,
and it recorded accomplishments that, however inadequate, should not be denigrated. The Jim Crow system
came tumbling down, and Lyndon Johnson 's Great Society programs made heroic, if not always well-designed,
efforts to draw Black men and women into the mainstream and into the beckoning promises of the American Dream.
But the promises failed, or, to put the matter more
precisely, they did not succeed at a rate rapid enough
to keep step with heightened demands and expectations.
Black people's fortunes improved, but not fast enough,
far enough, or evenly enough to satisfy a generation
impatient with marginal increments. It was in this context that insistence on programs of affirmative action
arose.
At first the programs called simply and uncontroversially for special efforts to prepare Black people to
take advantage of the educational and occupational
opportunities newly opened up to them. But before
long, especially in the stagnant economic conditions of
the 1970s, civil rights leaders began to insist that Blacks
3

be guaranteed a certain proportion of desired social
outcomes in jobs and education. Political leaders responded, and affirmative action took on a new meaning.
Artless circumlocutions spoke of "goals and timetables," or of "good-faith efforts" to end "underutilization" of minorities, but behind the euphemisms frequently lay the reality of quotas : however it's done, get
x per cent of Blacks into the program. Opposition to
quotas developed quickly, and the new doctrine of affirmative action has for better than a decade divided
the nation along racial and ideological lines.
The argument cuts deep because the stakes are so
high. The quota system undermines the basic principles
of the American Dream: the new programs of "racial
balance" require that, where necessary, individual
rights be superseded and overridden by standards of
group entitlement. Quotas necessarily imply patterns
of "reverse discrimination," in which people's interests
get weighed not according to individual merit or right
but according to considerations of racial origin. Assuming, for example, a limited number of positions
available in medical schools, it follows that for every
person given preferential admission to such a position
by race, another, presumably more qualified , individual is excluded, and on grounds of dubious moral standing. Race appears to be the great stumbling block of the
American Dream : for much of our history, the Dream
could only be seen as the American way if one ignored
the condition of Black people; today it i.s to be discarded
as the American way because-or so it seems to someit frustrates the progress of Black people.
That the quota system constitutes a fundamental redefinition of civil rights and national values becomes
clear in the nature of the arguments characteristically
offered by the system's defenders. Seldom are quotas
defended in principle ; advocates normally make their
case in terms of practical necessity, and with some expression of regret that the pervasiveness of white racism
and/ or the burdens of Black history make necessary so
drastic a departure from American traditions. The real
indication of philosophical uneasiness comes when, as
is often the case, defenders argue that the quota system
is only a "temporary" expedient, a short-run requirement that, after some indeterminate period, can safely
and suitably be junked. One becomes suspicious of a
cause for which so little case in principle can be found.
This is not at all to suggest that the argument for
quotas is trivial. The suffering and deprivation that lie
behind advocacy of the new affirmative action must not
be ignored or minimized. If Blacks have little regard
for the values represented in the American Dream, it
is for the entirely understandable reason that the benefits of those values have not often been present in their
lives. We do not for a moment believe that opposition
to quotas comes predominantly from _racists or from
those callously indifferent to the plight of Blacks, but
elimination of that suspicion among Black people will
require more than p ious declarations of good will from
4

anti-quota forces.
Opponents of quotas can point first of all to history.
Oppressed minorities of various kinds- Jews, Orientals,
and, perhaps most pertinently, Blacks from the West
Indies-have managed to advance in America despite
the barriers of establishment prejudice. Economic historians like Thomas Sowell (himself a Black) have demonstrated conclusively that minorities equipped with
sufficient community cohesion and the required economic skills and values can make their way even in the
face of discriminatory attitudes. Indeed, the emergence
in recent decades of a significant and growing Black
middle class offers the best evidence available that
Blacks need not depend on quotas to improve their
situation.
Quot as aid those in Black society who can
best do without them; minority applicants
for the Harvard Law School do not, after all,
typically come from the inner-city ghetto.

The great economic and social problem within the
Black community exists in the lower class, and it is,
ironically enough, that class that least benefits from the
quota system. Quotas aid those in Black society who can
best do without them; minority applicants for the Harvard Law School do not typically come from the innercity ghetto. No ·one can doubt that Black urban communities require assistance from the general society,
but a quota system seems of minimal relevance to the
problems those communities face.
One senses that the argument over quotas has taken
on symbolic meaning far removed from questions of
substance. Perhaps if people in the Black community
could reasonably be assured of the commitment of
whites to the end of discriminatory practices, they
would be less attracted to the seductive allure of quotas.
The Reagan Administration can muster impressive
philosophical and moral arguments against quota systems, but those arguments will only take on resonance
among Blacks if they are expressed in the context of
strict enforcement of anti-segregationist laws and of
genuine willingness to help Black people to help themselves. The form that help should take is not easily prescribed. It must include welfare, but it also go beyond
welfare, which, however necessary in the short run, is a
demonstrated dead end as a permanent solution.
Racial antagonisms continue to disfigure American
politics above anything else. We shall never fully be
able to believe in ourselves until we persuade ourselves
that we have done all that we can to overcome the legacies of racial oppression that haunt our history. Immersion in guilt is not the answer, nor is betrayal-even in
the noblest of causes-of those values that characterize
our society at its best. The American Dream has not
failed us , and it still holds infinite promise if only we
have the wit to extend its blessings and its disciplines
to all within the American community.
C:
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The Communion of Saints
A Journey into the Past
Mark R. Schwehn

It all began, this journey into the past, on a drizzly
November morning, just after Thanksgiving Day, 1982.
The grandson, the grandson 's wife, and the grandson's
daughter had been visiting the grandson's sister and
her family , near Decatur, Indiana. Three miles west of
the sister's house, at the intersection of Highway 27 and
County Road 350W (known to locals as the Church
Road), the three travelers had stopped for gasoline,
before beginning their return trip to Chicago.
"You look familiar, son," the gas station owner remarked, as he was fumbling with the dip stick, "aren 't
you . . . ?"
"Yes, I am," the grandson replied . "My grandfather
used to be the pastor at the church across the highway.
So I've visited here at St. John's , Bingen, many times
before. My daughter was baptized here."
"I knew it!" said the gas station owner. "I still miss
your grandfather. Why, the two of us used to sit here"
(by this time the two had moved inside the station where
they were sitting on the ice cream cooler) "almost every
day and talk about the church. Your grandfather always
said . .. "
At this point, the owner abruptly stopped remembering, leaving the grandson partly tantalized and partly
relieved. Then the owner suddenly spoke again , "Come
on into the house-it's right next door-I've got somethin' fer ya ."
Once inside the house, the owner explained that his
father had died that year, that he had left many mysterious things behind, and that among them was an old
Day Book that had been kept by the grandson's grandfather for the year 1928, during the first year of his ministry at St. John's Lutheran Church, Hannibal , Missouri .
Since the grandson had himself grown up in Hannibal,
and since he knew or thought he knew a little history ,
he was instantly struck with two ideas at once. Thinking
first, "The area around the St. John 's where this Day
Book was kept and the area around the St. John's where
this Day Book is now received, the Mississippi valley of
Missouri and the farm country of Northeast Indiana ,

Mark R. Schwehn is on the faculty of Christ Colleg e in
Valparaiso University. His most recent contribution to The
Cresset, "Making Sense of College Students: The Theory
of Cognitive Development," appeared in November, 1983.
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were the two cradles of Missouri Synod Lutheranism."
And thinking second, "This could be happening only
in the Missouri Synod, for where else, except within
this tribally filiated church body, could you pull into a
gas station and retrieve a family treasure?" At this precise moment, here at the crossroads of Highway 27 and
the Church Road, the grandson felt the presence of his
past more surely than he had ever felt it before.
He did not know then, however, that the retrieval of
the Day Book would mark the beginning of a long journey for him , spatially from Bingen to Chicago, temporally from the twentieth to the thirteenth century. Nor
did he know what would prove to be even more important, that the Day Book was not a diary but a story, an d
that the story was not just his grandfather's, but that it
in some sense belonged to the same Synod that had
formed both the grandfather and the grandson. So it
was only after reading the Day Book and feeling his
grandfather's story shade into his story on the one side
and into history on the 0ther that the grandson decided
that a little of the story that began at the crossroads
might be worth telling.
II

On July 29, 1928, the grandfather commemorated the
fifteenth anniversary of his ordination by recalling th e
sequence of events that had led him to Hannibal , where
he would soon face the gravest crisis of his ministry. "I
recall today, " the grandfather wrote in his Day Book,
"how already in my fourth and fifth year I would be
lifted onto the table and pretend preaching." H is "desire to enter the ministry" had thus been "planted" within him by his "God-fearing and pious father ," and had
been "deeply impressed upon the soul" by the first pastor of Trinity Lutheran Church, Ft. Wayne , Indiana,
where the grandfather was confirmed in the spring of
1904. Nine years later, on July 29, 1913, he was ordained,
again at Trinity, Ft. Wayne, by the same pastor who had
confirmed him and under the proud eyes of the parents
who had lifted him up so that he could preach.
About one month after his ordination , on August 24,
1913, the grandfather was installed at Concord, North
Carolina, having been called to serve a "Negro Mis ·
sion" there. F~e years later, he was appointed "Superintendent of the Southeastern Negro Mission Field ."
His eldest son , the grandson's father, was born in Con5

During the course of his pastoral and personal relationship with one man, the grandfather
achieved painfully new and deeper understandings of both himself and the church he served.

cord, and his earliest childhood memories also involved
tables. Though he had, in his turn, become a Lutheran
minister, he did not remember tables as preaching platforms. He recalled instead how, when he was four or
five, he used to hide under the kitchen table, while the
Ku Klux Klan burned crosses on the grandfather's lawn.
~hough the family records were spotty for this period,
the grandson had a modest historical imagination that
could be called upon to fill the gaps. He knew, for example, that being a German minister to a "Negro Mission" in the South during the period of World War I
and its aftermath could not have been an easy task.
The grandfather's next task was not easy either. In the
spring of 1921, he accepted a call to a Lutheran congregation in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On January 1,
1928, he wrote about his years in Philadelphia as a part
of the first entry in his Day Book. In reviewing my Philadelphia ministry of almost six years, I cannot but help to
remember the loving kindness of my dear Savior who bore
with me throughout it all-though it was performed with
much imperfection and weakness on my part. He blessed it
abundantly so that the congregation was known as another of
those instances of divine grace. Coming to it when the church
was for sale, the membership disrupted, my predecessor uncovered as immoral and having resigned the ministry, the
Lord worked wonders through His Word. I left Philadelphia
reluctantly and left behind a loyal membership evidencing
devotion to the very last.
Though the grandfather had borne many crosses,
burning or otherwise, during the first f0urteen years of
his ministry, none of them had aroused in him the sense
of "fear and trembling" with which he had approached
St. John's, Hannibal, in the spring of 1927. He had arrived there in late March and was "inducted" into his
office "on the fourth Sunday in Lent-Laetare-March
27." By January of 1928, when he began keeping his Day
Book, the problem that had so daunted him before his
arrival had deepened. Then, during·1928, it underwent
a surprising but decisive transformation until , by the
year's end, it had become as much an inner spiritual
crisis as an outer social and ecclesiastical one.

III
The most urgent problems that parish ministers face
present themselves in human and particular forms. The
resolutions of these problems are therefore trials of
Christian character, not applications of Scriptural or
ecclesiastical imperatives. Accordingly, the story of the
grandfather's 1928 struggles in Hannibal can be discerned more in the pattern of his pastoral visits than in
the content of his .occasionally abstract reflections. He
encountered the complex network of conflicts at St.
John's, Hannibal, embodied in the person of one JH.
6

And during the course of his pastoral and personal relationship with this one man, the grandfather achieved
painfully new and deeper understandings of both himself and his church.
The grandfather's principal activity was pastoral visitation. Indeed, he closed every Day Book entry with a
running count of the number of "days" (not counting
Sundays, study days , or days when he was away from
the parish) and "visits" (counting both the ca lls that he
made on people who were at home and the call s on people who were not). During 1928, he went to one circus,
attended four Chautauqua meetings, witnessed one
cancer operation and one Caesarian section, barely
escaped being run over by his own car, buried a stillborn child, attended four silent movies and one "soundie," registered as a Democrat, preached over one hundred different sermons-some of them in German,
others in English-substituted for absent school teachers,
presided at countless committee meetings , taught one
adult Bible class and one eighth-grade confirmation
class, conducted 'several weddings and as · many funerals, traveled throughout the Midwest on behalf of Valparaiso University, took a three-week vacation consisting mainly of church conferences, and completed
852 "visits" in 257 "days."
The most urgent problems that parish
ministers face present themselves in human
and particular forms. The resolutions of
these problems are therefore trials of
Christian character, not applications of
Scriptural or ecclesiastical imperatives.

Of all of these visits , only the twenty-seven that he
made at the home of JH between January 9 and October
5 told a definite story. At the beginning of the year, JH
had been seriously ill, and so there had been a series of
sick calls bunched together on January 9, 16, and 18,
and continued on February 3, 7, 11 , 27, and 28, some of
them lasting for an entire afternoon . Then, on May 25,
the grandfather baptized JH "in church in the presence
of his wife, the president of the congregation, and an
elder." The next day, the grandfather gave private
communion to both JH and his wife. Thereafter, regular visitations ceased until late September, after which
time they grew steadily more frequent-two on September 27, one on September 28, three on September 29,
one on September 30, two on October 1, two more on
October 2, one on October 3, two on October 4, and one
last visit on October 5. Later that day, at 4:30 p.m., JH
died.
On <;>ctober 6, the grandfather prepared the funeral
sermon for his parishioner. Oh God, he wrote at the end
of the evening, this day has been one of great distress spiritThe Cresset

The "lodge problem " in t he grandfat h er's parish was on the way to resolution until it changed
from a conflict within the congregation to a conflict between the congregation and t he Synod.

ually . .At times I wonder whether I have the qualities for the
ministry. Should I not resign rather than labor in the way of
doubt . . . . I am worried and nervous. What shall I do? Hardly
fit to preach tomorrow! Though he overcame his selfdoubt and preached the next day, the circumstances of
that preaching revealed the nature of the "great problem" at St. John's, even as the funeral itself spurred the
congregation into taking new steps in order to resolve it.
In the afternoon, the grandfather wrote on October 7,
I conducted the funeral of JH, my friend and panshioner,
whom I was privileged to lead to Chrnt through the Word
and the ~ft of Holy Baptism on May 25 of this year. I conducted the services at the house and preached on I Corinthians 15:47-48, while the Knights Templars conducted the
services at the grave. I did not go to the cemetery.
JH had been a lodge member, and the lodge problem
was the difficulty that had so vexed both the grandfather and his congregation. The complications of the
problem can only be glimpsed by noting the congregation's compromise solutions to them, solutions that were
proposed on the very day that JH was buried. On that
afternoon, the president of the congregation decided to
"take a forward step on the lodge question" by recommending a "future policy with regard to lodge burials.
The congregation will offer Christian burial to such of
her members who are affiliated with lodges providing
the lodge takes no part in the services either at the
house, church, or the grave. A lodge member who is a
member of the congregation shall therefore decide
whether he or she prefers a lodge or a church funeral."
Other, more dramatic "solutions" followed quickly
after JH's funeral. On October 11, one parishioner informed the grandfather that he had resigned from the
Knights of Pythias Lodge. Another resigned from the
Elks. On October 30, the church council approved the
recommendation regarding burials. These private disclosures and policy changes convinced the grandfather
that the Lord was "moving in a quiet way and will, I am
sure, prove to me and others the power of His mighty
Word." The grandson attributed these changes to the
patience, charity, and prudence of his grandfather. The
grandfather attributed them to "fasting and prayer."
Probably both were right.

IV
Though the grandfather and his parish seemed satisfied on October 30 that the "lodge problem" was on the
way to resolution, the problem itself soon changed from
a conflict within the congregation to a conflict between
the congregation and the Synod. On the very next day
after the congregation had formulated its new policies,
the "official lodge committee of the Quincy Pastoral
Conference" came to St. John's "to find out what was
Apn·l, 1984

being done with regard to the lodge." They did not
agree with the measures proposed by the church council. Both the committee and the grandfather believed
that lodges were "contrary to the Scriptures." But whereas the grandfather had viewed this conflict as a human
one, requiring the exercise of charity and pastoral care,
the committee regarded it as an ecclesiastical one, requiring the rigid and forthright application of Synodical policy.
"Notable progress was made w ith regar d to
lodge funerals , " the grandfather had written.
"Much more progress might have been recorded
had it not been for interference on the part
of zealous brethren .. . who, meaning well
perhaps, overlooked the [need for] charity. "

Caught between the remorseless demands of the
Synod and the concern that he felt for his parishioners,
the grandfather had been brought, by the end of 1928,
to an excruciating dilemma. As he reviewed the year in
his Day Book entry for January 1, 1929, he articulated
this alarming development with precision, apprehension, and eloquence. Though the grandson was utterly
indifferent toward lodges, he felt, as he read the Day
Book entry, that the issues that it raised had become
altogether too familial and therefore altogether too
familiar.
With regard to the lodge, notable progress was made with
regard to lodge funerals . ... Much more progress might have
been recorded had it not been for interference on the part of
zealous brethren and conferences who, meaning well perhaps, overlooked the much needed charity in such instances.
(This year being also the time for the Triennial Convention
of our General Synodical Body at which time the Lodge will
from all indications be given much consideration.) This
leaves me apprehensive of what the future has in store for me
as regards my church relationship. With apparent measures
to be adopted and proposed on Lodge practice naturally
affecting me with a congregation "lodge-ridden," I cannot
but hope that it will not force me to seriously consider whether
to continue serving the present charge or being put face to
face with the choice to either remain loyal to my people or to
Synod. Convinced as I am of the conflict between Christ and
lodge and nevertheless by expen·ence being convinced that a
man may be a lodge member and, at the same time, a Chrntian as is clear to me from many examples of men and women in my own pa·rish, I still- thts more and more as time goes
on- am sure that just as men are daily exposed and come into
contact with other sins and commit them so also many are
lodge members out of weakness. Thts being the case I desire
to make them stronger in the faith through the ministry of
the Word and the Sacrament of the Holy Communion. And
now when a brother or a Synod demands that I cut off the
7

The grandson knew that, because of their gender, the church across the way would
forever bar both his wife and his daughter from standing behind the communion rail.

very one of whom I am convinced that he needs above all the
sacrament then I fear I shall have to choose to serve Christ
rather than Synod. I pray that it may never come, but should
affairs so shape themselves, then I want to have it recorded
here that I took that step sincerely to save men. I could not, I
believe, at this time, even let the sacrifice and pain such a
severence of sy nodical relation and kinship would cause deter
me. I shall let the righteous God judge me and pray when the
time comes that He will let me do nothing which shall hurt
my soul or the soul's welfare of others. And as we enter upon
another y ear may the Lord keep us all in faith and grace and
save us from the calamities of life! Visits: 1, day s: 0.

v
After he had received his grandfather's Day Book,
the grandson turned his attention to his fellow travelers and to the church across the highway. Between the
woman and the little girl in the car and the sanctuary of
St. John's, Bingen, there stood the same vexing conundrum that had so tormented his grandfather. The grandson's wife was not a Lutheran; she was an ordained minister in the United Church of Christ. And the grandson's
daughter was not a boy; she was a girl. The .grandson
knew that, because of their gender, the church across the
way would forever bar both his wife and his daughter
from standing behind the communion rail. Worse still ,
the same church, because his wife was merely a Christian
and not an LCMS Christian, would bar her from kneeling together with her husband in front of it. The fact
that his grandfather, if he had still been alive, might
have very well communed all three of them brought a
brief smile to his heart but only increased the ache he
felt in his head.
" I shall let the righteous God judge me,
the grandfather concluded, " and pray when
the time comes that he will let me do
nothing which shall hurt my soul or
the soul's welfare of others.
II

II

Since the grandson was still a Lutheran, he liked his
conundrums in the form of paradox!:!s. Why, he asked
himself, was the expensive gasoline on one side of the
highway available to all three of them and to all others
who stopped by the gas station, whereas the freely given
grace of God, present in the Sacrament of Holy Communion on the other side of the street, was available to
only one of them and to no others except for Missouri
Synod Lutherans? It seemed like the same man who on
one side of the highway was determined to make it easy
for the three of them together to get from there to Chicago would become equally determined on the other
side to make it impossible for the three of them to8

gether to get from there to eternity.
These difficulties required study, refinement , and
reformulation on the journey from the crossroads to
Chicago. The grandson would need help. He would
find it in the car and along the way. First, in Ft. Wayne ,
at his father's grave. Next, at Valparaiso in the Chapel
of the Resurrection . Then, at the University of Chicago.
Finally, in Maywood , Illinois, where at the home of his
friend , he would be taken back to the tiny village of
Josbach in Germany and to the thirteenth-century
church there, where his grandfather's grandfather was
baptized and married. The learning would be hard, but
the journey would be easy. At least he had plenty of
gasoline.
Cl
(This is the first part of a two-pari article. )

April Morning I Thoughts of Home
(to Annie and Rachel)

Above the ridge fir-velveted, where
sky erupts blue tissue, trembling, translucent,
it starts.
Windsong sighing distantly between
twin alps, gathering up the whistling of grasses
swaying hills
and now new violets "and daffodils."
Ah hear it bringing in the eye-high wheat's
sweet tenor relevance, filling hollows now with
choruses the orchards sing along.
Hear its joy,
spontaneous, against the house !
But suddenly
beneath my balcony, a child's voice intersects.
All static glee! Immediate! And suddenly
the iris stop their tangoing and oh!
Oh!
How I miss your small white arms about my neck,
the smell of Spring's first lilacs in your hair!

Lois Reiner
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The Nonviolent Alternative
Resistance by Other Means
Mel Piehl

The American Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on
War and Peace is already the most talked-about religious pronouncement on public policy since World
War II. Most of the controversy and media attentionwhich as usual amount to the same thing-have centered on the bishops' attitude toward nuclear deterrence, the nuclear freeze, and the arms race.
These are indeed crucial issues in the Letter, and
they deserve all the attention they can get. But so far
there has been a deafening silence about another theme
that should be equally provocative: the call in Section
III for nations to investigate and pursue nonviolent
means of conflict resolution and defense against aggression. "Nonviolent means of resistance to evil," the bishops declare, "deserve much more study and consideration than they have received." The bishops point out
that organized nonviolence may be an alternative to
war, and they suggest that "citizens ... be trained in the
techniques of peaceable non-compliance and noncooperation as a means of hindering an invading force
or non-democratic government from imposing its will."
These striking recommendations have been surprisingly echoed in the French Catholic Bishops' war and
peace letter, which appeared shortly after the American
bishops' statement. Media attention focused on the
French document's disagreement with the American
one on deterrence and the nuclear freeze, but ignored
the fact that the French bishops also pleaded that urgent study and effort be given to determining whether
nonviolent direct action may provide an alternative
method of defense.
If, as seems likely, both of these appeals are forgotten,
it will hardly be surprising, for nonviolent action has
long been the Purloined Letter of politics : readily visible but easily overlooked or dismissed.
Why this should be so is something of a mystery.
From the sixteenth-century Dutch struggle against the
Spanish to the Solidarity movement in Poland, non-
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violent direct action has been widely used as a method
of national defense and social change. That it was known
to the ancients is evident not only from historical accounts of plebeian resistance and boycotts in Rome, but
from literary sources such as Aristoph anes' comic
Lysistrata, in which wives refuse sexual relations until
their husbands end their warfare. The Bible, too, contains similar incidents: the Israelites' Exodus from
Egypt-leaving aside the miraculous methods of pressuring Pharaoh and the divine killing of the Egyptian
firstborn in the end-is almost a textbook case of a nonviolent direct action campaign, complete with complex
negotiations and subtle manipulations and deceit on
both sides.
Yet despite its pervasiveness and frequent successful
use throughout history, nonviolent action has seldom
been discussed by even the most astute historians, political theorists, or moralists, much less been systematically
promoted by governments. In his 1973 book The Politics
of Nonviolent Action, poiitical theorist Gene Sharp suggested some possible reasons for this curious neglect:
the natural human fascination with violence and war,
which inevitably leaves a deep impression on the collective mind; the widespread but unexamined assumption,
even by sophisticated historians and social thinkers,
that political society depends finally on violence rather
than consent for its preservation; and the very variety
and subtlety of nonviolent action, which makes it d ifficult to simplify, dramatize, and comprehend in the way
that war-also an incredibly complex and diverse social
phenomenon-has traditionally been dramatized and
simplified in both elite and popular understanding.
To these reasons others can be added, as either supplements or corollaries: the general confusion of nonviolence with inaction, weakness, and pacifism; the complex relationship between nonviolent action and numerous forms of verbal and moral persuasion; and the
historical fact that nonviolent action has been used
primarily by poor and marginal social groups, while
the principal institution of modern politics, the wealthy,
violent national state, has relied on war.
In recent times, nonviolent action has also been obscured by contemporary media stress on violent conflict. In many cases small outbreaks of violence completely overshadow much larger nonviolent efforts. To
take an example plucked at random from recent newspapers, an Associated Press story leads off: "Twenty
9
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demonstrators were killed today in violent protests
against the government of Tunisian President Habib
Bourguiba." Only several paragraphs into the story do
other facts appear that present an impression very different from the headline and lead: thousands of demonstrators had boycotted stores and marched peacefully
in a dozen cities; in only two cities a small number of
demonstrators had smashed windows and thrown rocks
at police; and all of the' twenty dead had been shot by
the police.
While nothing in the headline, lead, or story was inaccurate, the effect is to give a greater significance to
the role of violence in achieving political aims-in
this case a successful rollback of food prices-and to
hide from consciousness the centrality of the much
broader nonviolent action. And in television newswhich is only newspaper lead paragraphs with pictures-this effect is multiplied many times over.
A major result of the historic neglect of nonviolence
is the virtual absence of any continuous intellectual or
institutional tradition upon which those engaging in
nonviolent action might draw. With some exceptions,
each nonviolent action campaign has had to start from
scratch in its own place and time, a crippling political
weakness in many cases.
As Sharp notes, the inattention to nonviolence also
leads to a gross double standard in judging its effectiveness. Because they may know a few instances where
nonviolence has failed to resist aggression or achieve
political results, most people simply assume the superiority of violent methods of achieving these aims . But
they seldom consider the numerous cases where nonviolent action has successfully achieved great political
results and violence has failed.
Thus, most people aware of the underground resistance to Nazism in occupied Europe think in terms of
the armed partisans rather than the popular, effective
nonviolent resistance that had nearly crippled Nazi
power in Denmark and Norway by the end of the war.
They think of the "Rtissian Revolution" in terms of the
violent Bolshevik takeover of October, 1917, and elide
the almost completely nonviolent revolution that overthrew the Czarist government in March of that year.
Similarly, it is tempting to conclude from , say, the
unsuccessful Czech nonviolent resistance to the Russian
occupation in 1968 that nonviolent action is an inadequate defense against aggression. Yet no one argues that
the failure of the violent Filipino resistance to American imperialism in 1898-1901 proves that war is an
inadequate defense against aggression.
It seems that when violence fails, political or technical limitations are blamed ; when nonviolent action
fails, the whole technique is dismissed as faulty. Instances of ineffective nonviolent resistance are not often
10

examined for weaknesses of personnel, training, organization, communications, tactics, time, resources,
environmental conditions, and the like-the sorts of
factors everyone understands to be critical to success or
failure in war. And where nonviolence does achieve
even partial successes against extraordinary odds, the
tendency is to forget, dismiss, or minimize the achievement, and not to examine its possible lessons for future
campaigns, as military theorists commonly do.
Perhaps the best proof of nonviolent action's historic
neglect is that few people can even say what it is, although like Justice Stewart on pornography, they might
know it when they see it. Nonviolent action is simply
coercive political behavior short ?f violence. As such,
it is to be distinguished from pacifism, which is principled objection to war, and from purely moral and
political persuasion, which is the attempt to gain political ends without coercive behavior. Nor is nonviolent
action to be simply identified with passive resistance,
the principled refusal to accept political coercion, or
with civil disobedience, the deliberate violation of law
for political ends. Though nonviolent action may be
used in conjunction with one or more of these elements,
it is not inherently dependent on any of them for either
its logic or its success.
As Sharp contends, it is useful to consider political
behavior not simply as "violent" or "nonviolent," but
rather as existing on a wide spectrum ranging from passive quiescence or inactivity to collective violence and
war. (Nuclear war may be somewhere off the chart,
listed under suicide rather than politics.) Since nonviolent action is, by definition, both active and political ,
it must not be confused with behavior which, whether
principled or not, seeks no political or social end. Thus,
for example, the Jehovah's Witnesses' refusal to salute
the flag or accept blood transfusions is not nonviolent
action, though it is passive resistance, because it seeks
a purely religious end.
The confusion of nonviolent action with passivity or
passive resistance arises because nonviolent action often
relies on the specific technique of noncooperation, which
is the withdrawal of political consent or the refusal to
engage in expected social behavior in order to attain
some desired end. Many kinds of boycotts, embargoes,
tax refusals, work stoppages, strikes, and sit-ins are
forms of noncooperation, and constitute direct political
action , even though the specific behavior-refusal to
buy a product, or go to work, or pay a tax-may itself
be "passive."
The spectrum of nonviolent action itself is very wide,
ranging from verbal or symbolic behavior, such as making speeches, signing petitions, or wearing distinctive
clothing, on the one side, to aggressively nonviolent
physical coercion, such as blockades, building takeThe Cresset
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overs, or institutional disruptions, on the other. In between stand the tremendous variety of nonviolent action
techniques that have been employed for centuries all
over the globe: elections, public assemblies, marches,
pickets, fasts, bonfires, economic and social boycotts of
every conceivable kind, strikes, draft resistance, mutinies, interference with social services, sit-ins, lie-ins, and
lots-of-other-ins, the formation of alternative institutions, and many, many others.
In the history of nonviolent action, a surprisingly
high rate of success has been attained by novel, comic,
or outrageous techniques. This might be called the
"Good Soldier Schweik Effect," after the Czech resistance hero who reported to a gloomy Hapsburg draft
induction center in full uniform and shouting enthusiastically "Glory to the Emperor Franz Joseph!" and
"On to Paris!" He was immediately declared mentally
unfit for service. Other examples in the same vein have
included the satirical imitation of Nazi songs and insignia (Denmark), banging of pots and pans (Chile),
nudity, bee attacks, public strewing of garbage, and at
least one instance of Lysistratan boycott.
The Czechs were particularly ingenious at this sort of
thing during their briefly successful resistance to the
Russians in 1968. They scrambled telephone systems,
altered highway and street signs, set up wild-goose
chases, and so on, all to the evident demoralization of
the Soviet army. Perhaps the extreme reluctance of the
Russians to send their own troops into Poland is traceable to memories of that experience.
Some interpretations of nonviolent action would extend the spectrum to include the threat of material violence or sabotage, while others would even include
sabotage itself, so long as there was no threat or possibility of injury to persons. But most proponents of
nonviolent action, especially principled ones, rule out
even the threat of material violence because of the potential for injury, as well as the strong tendency of such
behavior to undermine the ethos and discipline necessary for successful collective nonviolence. Others, like
Daniel Berrigan, have drawn the line at the sabotage of
political or symbolic property, e.g., draft card records.
While each of the numerous nonviolent techniques
may be described and analyzed in its own terms, most
important nonviolent campaigns have made tactical
use of several of them. Sometimes there is a progression
from relatively "mild" actions such as petitions, to
directly revolutionary nonviolent behavior, as in the
first Russian Revolution. In other cases many techniques may be used simultaneously, as in Polish Solidarity's sophisticated combination of strikes, marches ,
and "symbolic" religious behavior.
While few Americans know much about nonviolent
action campaigns in other countries, they ought to be
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aware of some of the major applications of such political
methods in our own history. A brief description of the
anti-British resistance movement, abolitionism, the
labor movement, and the civil rights movement may
suggest some of the great variety of techniques and
goals such campaigns may have.
In the history of nonviolent action, a
surprisingly high rate of success has been
attained by novel, comic, or outrageous
techniques. This might be called the "Good
Soldier Schweik Effect," after the Czech
resistance hero who reported to a Hapsburg
draft induction center in full uniform and
shouting "Glory to the Emperor Franz
Joseph!" and "On to Paris!" He was quickly
declared mentally unfit for service.

Although pockmarked by sporadic violent incidents,
the movement that culminated in American independence was primarily one of nonviolent resistance until
177 4. Beginning with the opposition to the Stamp Act
in 1765, the colonial patriots engaged in extraordinarily
intelligent and sustained campaigns of resistance, which
at first aimed simply at the repeal of particular British
taxes and legislative acts, but eventually worked to
undermine imperial authority generally.
The primary technique used to force repeal of the
Stamp Act and the Townshend Acts was nonconsumption or nonimportation of British goods and other
forms of direct tax resistance. But the economic boycotts were accompanied by petitions, rallies, demonstrations, effigy burnings, ostracizing of government
officials and British sympathizers, and the like. Occasionally the nonviolent campaign relied on at least implied threats of violence, as when large delegations of
the Sons of Liberty would "visit" an official or importer
en masse to secure compliance with the resistance. But
considering that few of the resisters were principled
believers in nonviolence, their general restraint from
violence is remarkable.
Only after the Boston Tea Party and the Intolerable
Acts of 1774 did most colonial resisters accept the necessity of violence in their struggle. The Tea Party itself
is one of the great historical examples of nonviolent
sabotage, involving a carefully defined target of the
highest political, symbolic, and economic significance.
It is also notable that sabotage was used only after numerous other nonviolent techniques failed to force the
return of the tea from Boston, as they did in other ports.
While the eventual resort to violence may be said to
mark a failure of the colonists' nonviolence, one should
not overlook the judgment of John Adams and others
that the "real Revolution" was accomplished by the
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political action before the war.
The abolitionist movement of the early nineteenth
century also relied heavily on nonviolent action . Abolitionism began with the newspapers , petitions, and
speaking campaigns of William Lloyd Garrison and his
circle of believers in principled nonresistance to violence and coercion, which for them included all forms
of politics. From there it spread to more politically engaged agitators, who used marches, boycotts of slavemade products, and numerous other methods to sway
broad segments of northern opinion against slavery.
Although only a tiny minority of northern antislavery
was truly abolitionist, abolitionist nonviolent action
sometimes achieved significant political effects, notably
in the widespread resistance that rendered the Fugitive
Slave Act unenforceable.
The labor movement in this country has always relied
heavily on nonviolent action techniques, notably the
strike and the boycott. While workers and unions occasionally instigated violence against employers, it was
far more common for employers and the government to
use violence to break strikes and unions , as in the Pullman Strike of 1894, the Ludlow Massacre of 1913-14, and
the steel strike of 1919. The Wagner Act of 1935 officially
guaranteed labor the right to organize and strike, but
employers generally resisted the law until the great
General Motors sit-down strike of 1937, when workers
occupied the Flint automobile factories and refused
to leave until GM agreed to recognize and bargain with
the union. Although courts ruled the sit-down illegal ,
state officials refused to enforce their orders, and the
companies were finally forced to give in. Like the colonial resisters, most labor organizations have adhered to
nonviolence for practical rather than moral reasons;
nevertheless, their frequently successful use of strikes,
sit-ins, and other tactics to achieve a balance of power
in the workplace testifies to the efficacy of nonviolence
under certain conditions.
Finally, the civil rights movement constitutes perhaps
the most familiar case of nonviolent action in America.
Anticipated by demonstrations and civil disobedience
of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and even
earlier Black efforts, Dr. Martin Luther King's Montgomery bus boycott of 1955 set off a decade of nonviolent civil rights activity. The movement used nearly
every nonviolent technique previously known , and invented a few new ones, such as the "freedom ride" and
"white buyer" methods of opposing housing discrimination. As a close student of Gandhi , A. J. Muste, and
other advocates of nonviolence, King was by far the
most theoretically sophisticated and politically astute
practitioner of nonviolent action in American history.
The very complexity and extensiveness of the movement means that it is only beginning to be understood
12

and interpreted. Like Gandhi , King brilliantly employed a subtle combination of nonviolent political
techniques designed to pressure his opponents with
appeals to moral principles designed to persuade them.
While King himself and his closest followers were Christian pacifists, he was able, at least until 1965, to retain
the support of whites and the Black masses who did not
share his perspective.
These examples indicate that nonviolent action is by
no means foreign to American political tradition, and
that much is to be learned by examining historical experience from this perspective. But it is also evident that
there are many theoretical questions involving nonviolent action to which history offers few answers.
Since it obviously touches on fundamental issues concerning the nature of social existence, legal and moral
authority, and political obligation, it is hardly surprising that nonviolent action is fraught with ambiguity and
paradox. The most striking one involves the intricate
relationship between nonviolent action and morality.
As described here, nonviolent action is not a moral
principle or goal, but a political technique. And like
political violence, it depends on coercion, not moral
suasion, to gain its ends.
It is easy to refute the view that nonviolent action relies on any necessary moral principle or goal. The British did not repeal the Stamp Act because they had become persuaded of the American case, but because they
could not enforce it. General Motors and Ford did not
recognize the United Auto Workers because they were
convinced that workers have a right to organize and
strike, but because workers forcibly occupied their
plants and prevented them from doing business.
For this reason , some interpreters of nonviolence rule
moral persuasion and principle out of court when examining the effective use of nonviolence. For them, nonviolence is attractive because it can be shown to be politically more effective than violence under certain conditions, and they contend that it should not be linked with
moral or social ideals. It is simply war by other means.
But it may not be so easy to sever the connection that
has often existed between nonviolent action and moral
or even religious principles. For even in many cases
where nonviolent action is adopted for pragmatic reasons, it often takes on a distinctly moral coloration.
Simply because the systematic use of nonviolence in
serious conflicts requires a conscious decision to refrain from violence, nonviolent campaigns tend to develop a discipline that is at least akin to moral solidarity. In a nonviolent campaign, the inability to control
violence by even a tiny minority of participants discredits the entire cause. In this sense the media's tendency to single out violent incidents in such campaigns
is justified, for it is an indirect acknowledgment that
The Cresset
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nonviolent action derives authority from restraint.
And this authority is as much moral as political.
In nonviolent campaigns, the charge of violence
against an opponent frequently becomes an important
element. This suggests that the very appeal to nonviolent action raises the confrontation to a different plane
than exists where violence is a legitimate weapon. As in
the case of Bull Connor's use of dogs and clubs against
civil rights demonstrators in Birmingham, the use of
violence under such conditions reveals an opponent's
moral as well as political weakness. Even when violent
power "wins" the immediate confrontation, as in Poland
or Chile at present, the authorities' ability to govern is
in constant jeopardy. Chairman Mao's alleged statement that power comes out of the barrel of a gun may
be true of war, where guns are the weapon of choice.
But by choosing different weapons, nonviolent action
tends to affirm Lincoln's claim that power divorced
from moral considerations cannot long endure.
In Moral Man and Immoral Society Reinhold Niebuhr
constructed an extremely subtle critique of nonviolent
action from a Christian perspective. He concluded that
because true nonviolent action includes a necessary element of coercion, it is fundamentally incompatible with
the highest religious and ethical ideals, being closer in
kind to violence than to the passive resistance advocated
by Christ.
On this ground Niebuhr criticized Gandhi not because he practiced nonviolent action- Niebuhr heartily
applauded the Indian independence movement- but
because Gandhi maintained that his movement was designed to befriend and convert his opponents as well as
coerce them. Although Gandhi, unlike Martin Luther
King, did not speak of "loving enemies," he did appeal
to the British on grounds of morality, justice, and
honor, even as he continued his mass campaigns to
drive them out of India.
Niebuhr's criticism is shrewd, but it may underestimate the subtle connection between nonviolence and
moral suasion. In the cases of Gandhi and King, it is
hard to regard their moral appeals as a pious or sentimental overlay to campaigns resting fundamentally on
the admittedly coercive power of nonviolent action.
Rather, what we see in such cases is that nonviolent coercion and moral suasion are so subtly and completely
combined that the distinction begins to be lost to all
parties concerned. While from one point of view. this
fusion might be regarded as clever Machiavellian strategy (telling your opponents you love and respect them
while forcing them to do something will, if nothing else,
throw them off balance}, it is more likely that it reflects
some deeper fusion of motive within the moral or religious personality, which is reflected in this doubleedged external form.
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At the very least, the results of this kind of confrontation appear to be more salutary than purely political
struggles. One of the chestnuts about Gandhi is that his
movement worked only because the British were too
moral to crush it violently.
This will not wash. The British left India because
they were forced to get out, not because Gandhi appealed
to their better natures. Nothing in the nature of British
society or character prevented them from using the
most strenuous violence to preserve their Empire, as
their fierce suppression of the colonial rebellions in
Kenya and Malaya indicates.
But the fact is that that kind of violence could not
work against an opponent like Gandhi, and the British
knew it-although imperialists like Churchill sputtered
furiously at the trap they were in.
Yet the happy result was the same as if the British had
had moral scruples about violence: Indian independence
came with little bloodshed between British and Indians.
And this was the result of the kind of campaign Gandhi
conducted.
Westerners with visions of skinny saints in loincloths
are always discovering that Gandhi was-horrors!-a
politician. Satisfied that they have unmasked a pious
hypocrite, they seldom bother to inquire further into
what kind of politician. he was, namely, one to whom
principle was more important than power.
It is to the credit of the British that they were able to
accept their defeat with good grace and withdraw with
honor. But it is also true to say that Gandhi, by employing the morally superior techniques of nonviolent action, enabled the British to display the better side of their
political character. Moral appeals alone would simply
have inspired contempt for their weakness. But when
combined with the politically effective methods of nonviolent action, they permitted both sides to continue
relations on a more just and open basis than typically
follows a violent conflict.
In my opinion Martin Luther King accomplished a
similar result in the American South. American race
relations are never good, but they are infinitely better
today than they used to be because King ended the ugly
apartheid system in a way that permitted most white
southerners to accept Black power as a practical necessity and establish relations on a new basis.
None of this answers the question of whether nonviolence could have worked against Hitler. But even
mankind's limited experience with nonviolence up to
now does confirm the bishops' claim that "non-violence
is not the way of the weak," and should strengthen their
call for study, particularly in universities, "to develop
programs for rigorous interdisciplinary resear~h, education, and training directed to peacemaking expertise."

••
••
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Three Faces of Conservatism
Thomas Aquinas, Herman Dooyeweerd,
and Leo Strauss

Paul Benoit

Conservatism, as a term of political discourse, owes
its origin to the French Revolution. It was then that the
lines were drawn between those who wished to alter
society, to found it on a new basis that would accord
with man's new, secular understanding of himself, and
those who wished to preserve, if not all the institutions
of the old society, then at least its basis in a law and
order that was understood to be of divine origin and
intent.
In the English-speaking world, the figure of Edmund
Burke stands above all others as the spokesman for the
conservative point of view. 1 His Reflections on the Revolution in France, published in 1790, marks the start of a
conscious tradition of political thought and action deliberately set against the current of the Enlightenment.
There are problems, however, with assigning Burke so
pre-eminent a place in the conservative firmament.
First, his writings, being those of a politician, should
more appropriately be studied as political rhetoric than
as political philosophy. Second, some explanation must
be made of his party affiliation- he was after all a Whig.
Third, an account must be given of his influence on the
development of German romanticism, hardly a traditional conservative movement. Fourth, Burke's skepticism towards any kind of speculation or critical theorizing brings him close to David Hume, while his laissezfaire pragmatism in regard to the economic forces of
society places him in the company of Adam Smith.
Finally, and this is perhaps the most serious cause for
reservations about Burke, the standards by which a society is to be judged are no longer to be found, for Burke,
1
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beyond that society, but rather in the natural processes
that brought it about.
For example, when Burke discusses the share of
power, authority, and direction which each individual
ought to have in the management of the state, he denies
that it can be determined in advance in the light of a
natural order. Because we are talking about civil society,
he says, "it is a thing to be settled by convention. If civil
society be the offspring of convention, that convention
must be its law. That convention must limit and modify
all the descriptions of constitution which are formed
under it." 2
This article presupposes that a true conservative finds
his standards of judgment in a law and order that transcends the particular society of interest to him. These
standards are a given, not a fabrication, of human existence and are, furthermore, of super-human origin. The
article proposes three figures for consideration, who,
though very different from one another, all conform to
our definition of conservatism. The three figures chosen
are Thomas Aquinas, Herman Dooyeweerd, and Leo
Strauss.
The reason for choosing these three is that each one
can be taken to stand for a major tradition in the West:
the first, for the Roman Catholic; the second, for the
Calvinist; and the third, to a certain extent for the Jewish, but more importantly for the classical pre-Christian. Together they suggest something of the richness
and variety of pre-Enlightenment intellectual currents
and their ability to go on sustaining Western civilization against those who from beyond or within our gates,
with good or evil intent, want to have our civilization
refounded on the basis of the sovereignty of man rather
than conserve it on the basis of man's subjection to a
higher-than-man-made law and order. A further reason
for the choice of these three figures is that both Dooyeweerd and Strauss have left us criticisms of Thomas'
concept of natural law, thereby making their own positions, by contradistinction, clearer. It is illuminating to
see how Dooyeweerd and Strauss arrive at opposite
conclusions regarding Thomas.
2
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The Calvinist Herman Dooyeweerd criticized St. Thomas ' concept of natura/law for being too
dependent on reason, too dualistic, too subst ance-oriented, and too implicitly totalitarian.
II
For Thomas, concrete, individual, contingent beings
provide the starting point for philosophy. By referring
to things themselves and proceeding by analogy, man
can intuit an order in nature, an order that extends
throughout the universe and includes the constitution
of man. In his Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas has
sketched for us his approach to philosophy and how
he arrived at the idea of a natural order:
Man's soul has only a general apprehension of the order of divine
providence ; consequently. it must perfect its knowledge of what
pertains to that order in the particular. by reference to things themselves, in which the order of divine providence is already established
in detail. ... Now since man has both intelligence and sense and also
bodily strength. these. by the disposition of divine providence, are
subordinated to one another on the pattern of that order which is
found throughout the universe. Bodily strength being subordinate
to the sensitive and intellectual powers and ready to obey their commands. while the senses are subject to the intelligence and follow
its dictates. For the s~me reason there is a n order to be found among
men themselves ....

of the philosophy of law at the Free University of Amsterdam, while Strauss became a professor of political
philosophy, first at the New School for Social Research
in New York, then at the University of Chicago.
Both men spent their lives teaching and writing, both
had their works translated, and both attracted followers
from all parts of the Western world. Leo Strauss died in
1973, Herman Dooyeweerd in 1977. Perhaps the best
summary of the former's thought can be found in his
Natural Right and History, first published in 1953, the
latter's in In the Twilight of Western Thought, published
in 1960.
Dooyeweerd was remarkable for his firm conviction
that all thought, however objective or scientific it may
pretend to be, is rooted in a religious commitment ; that ,
is to say, it reveals the attitude of a human heart towards
the world. As Dooyeweerd himself put it:
The great turning point in my thought was marked by the discovery of the religious root of thought itself. whereby a new light
was shed on the failure of all attempts, including my own, to bring
about an inner synthesis between the Christian faith and a philosophy which is rooted in the self-sufficiency of human reason .
I came to understand the central significance of the "heart." repeatedly proclaimed by Holy Scripture to be the religious root of
human existence.
On the basis of this central Christian point of view I saw the need
of a revolution in philosophical thought of a very radical character.
Confronted with the religious root of the creation, nothing less is in
question than a relating of the whole temporal cosmos. in both its
so-called "natural" and "spiritual" aspects. to this point of reference.5

In h is Summa Theologt'ca, Thomas explains how manmade laws should be patterned on natural law, "that
order which is found throughout the universe":
In human affairs a thing is said to be just when it accords aright
with the rule of reason : and. as we have already seen. the first rule
of reason is the natural law. Thus all humanly enacted laws are in
accord with reason to the extent that they derive from the natural
law. And if a human law is at variance in any particular with the
natural law. it is no longer a law. but rather a corruption of law 4

The key to discovering any variance lies in man's right
use of his practical reason. Employed about contingent
matters, it must be able to distinguish between general
rules which can be ascertained easily enough and particular cases which can admit of exceptions.

III
Before outlining Dooyeweerd's approach and that of
Strauss, and their respective criticisms of Aquinas' line
of reasoning, it may be of use at this point to provide a
brief sketch of their lives, which ran on a parallel course.
Dooyeweerd was born in Holland in 1894, Strauss in
Germany in 1899. Dooyeweerd received his doctorate
of philosophy from the Free University in Amsterdam
in 1917. Strauss received his from the University of
Hamburg in 1921. Dooyeweerd then did research at the
Abraham Kuyper Foundation in the Hague on the revival of reformational scholarship which had begun in
Holland in the first half of the nineteenth century.
Strauss, for his part, did research at the Academy of
Jewish Research in Berlin in the field of 17th century
biblical criticism, with special emphasis on the doctrines of Spinoza. Dooyeweerd then became a professor
April, 1984

The Bible alone can provide man with an Arch imedean point from which to be truly critical, for it transcends the ordinary horizons of time and space. With its
motif of creation, fall, and redemption, it provides man
with an openly acknowledged criterion for judging
human affairs and orienting one's life.
It is from this perspective that Dooyeweerd criticized
Thomas' concept of a higher law and order. He found
it was too philosophical, too dependent on Aristotle's
concepts; he reproached Thomas for not having made
the Bible the sole point of departure for his teachings.
Dooyeweerd objected to the term natural and thought
of the higher law and order as a more all encompassing
cosmic law-order. More specifically, he criticized T homas' concept of natural law for being: (a) too dependent
on reason; (b) too dualistic; (c) too substance-oriented;
and (d) too implicitly totalitarian.
3

Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles, Book III . Chapter 81.
in Aquinas Selected Political Writings, ed. A.P. D'Entreves (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell. 1974). pp. 99-100 (the emphasis is mine).

4

Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, Ia Ilae. Question 95 . in Selected Political Writings, p. 129 .
5 Herman Dooyeweerd . quoted in L. Kalsbeck . Contours of a Christian

Philosophy (Toronto : Wedge Publishing Foundation. 1975). pp. 1920.
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In distinction to Thomas, Dooyeweerd would argue for a more limited and negative view of
the state, as a sword instituted by God for the purpose of restraining the wickedness of man.

As we saw earlier, for Thomas, the core of human nature lies in man's reason. It is through the use of his
reason that man can transcend the limitations of the
society he happens to be born into, become informed of
a higher law and order, and thus participate in the
divine world plan. For Dooyeweerd, however, it is
man's heart and not his reason that is at the root of
everything he does as a specifically human being. It is
man's heart that is capable of putting him in touch with
the divine. For Dooyeweerd it was more important that
man's response to the divine will be religious and therefore rooted in the heart rather than moral and rooted
in reason.
Dooyeweerd's second objection to Thomas' concept
of natural law is that, by definition , the realm of grace
has been excluded. The radical, original, integral character of creation has been divided in two: into an external realm of nature and an internal realm of grace.
An autonomous, self-sufficient natural realm has been
left to the governance of man's reason, by means of
which, for example, the principles of political life and
moral law are to be deduced, while a veil of ignorance
has been drawn over what has been revealed to man by
God about the life of the spirit.
As a result of this division, sin and redemption no
longer have an effect on the functions of the natural
world. Sin, instead of corrupting human nature, merely
causes the loss of the super-natural gift of grace, while
redemption only brings nature to its supernatural perfection. Another consequence that Dooyeweerd sees
resulting from this division is that the institutional
Church, as the sole dispensary of grace, comes to exercise universal dominion over all other temporal institutions since it alone has the necessary status to interpret
the natural moral law and to pass judgment on the limits
of competence of the state.
Dooyeweerd's third criticism of Thomas is that he
thinks of all natural beings as substances, i.e., as selfsufficient units of form and matter. According to this
Aristotelian doctrine, form gives shape to matter thereby realizing its potential or fulfilling its purpose. The
natural order that emerges as a result of this process
is characterized as teleological. At the same time, still
according to Aristotle and Thomas, these natural substances are so organized that each is form to some lower
matter and matter to some higher form to produce a
hierarchical chain of being.
Dooyeweerd criticizes this doctrine, however, for the
way it diminishes the innate meaning of things. Instead
of recognizing in nature a number of distinct sovereign
spheres, each with its own structure and function,
Thomas' doctrine results, according to Dooyeweerd, in
certain natural functions or beings coming to be more
highly valued than others. Certain things easily come
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to be treated as the means of some higher end or as the
constituent parts of some larger whole.
The point to be drawn from this objection is that in
an Aristotelian natural order things are referred to the
form directly above and thus come to be seen as simply
fulfilling a purpose or a function. In a Biblical, created
order, on the other hand, things are referred to their
point of or igin, i.e., their creator, and thus come to
acquire meaning.
Dooyeweerd's final criticism of Thomas' concept of
natural law is that it implies that the state is the bonding
agent of all natural society. Only the state can provide
man with all that serves the moral perfection of his
rational nature. All other social functions are matter
for the controlling form of the state, which holds the
various components of society in a continuous coherence and unity, leading them to the imminent goal of
the bond, which is the communal good. By means of its
laws, the state can supply whatever the lower associations cannot.
At the same time, since it is a strictly natural entity,
the state can never participate in the realm of grace. The
state can never truly become Christian or even try to
become Christian. The only way it can be Christian is
by serving the Church, preparing the ground for it and
following Church leadership in all things that the
Church judges to touch the welfare of souls. With the
perfection of the means of communication and control
in this century, the totalitarian state at the service of an
ideal has become a horrible reality. Dooyeweerd would
argue for a more limited and negative view of the state,
as a sword instituted by God for the purpose of restraining the wickedness of man.
In summary, for Dooyeweerd the laws posited by
man, the order instituted in society, must be derived
not only from those general laws revealed to man in
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If Dooyeweerd found Thom a s' concept of a higher law and order too philosophical, for Leo Strauss
it was not philosophical enough . S trauss preferr ed to speak of natural right, not natura/law.

creation, which for the most part are obeyed involuntarily anyway, but also from those special laws revealed
to man in the Bible. It is the radical , original unity of
the two that constitutes the higher law and order, a Jaw
and order that is truly cosmic.

IV
If Dooyeweerd found Thomas' concept of a higher
law and order too philosophical, for Leo Strauss it was
not philosophical enough. Strauss was uneasy about
the term law and preferred to speak of natural right. At
a number of points in his social teachings, Thomas'
thought seems informed by what man's reason on its
own could not possibly know, or at least not know with
such certainty.
On the first page of The City of Man, Leo Strauss
wrote:
It is not sufficient for everyone to obey and to listen to the Divi ne
message of the C ity of Righteousness. the Faithful City. In order to
propagate th at message a mong the heathen. nay. in order to understand it as clearly and as fully as is humanly possible. one must also
consider to what ex tent man cou ld discern the outlines of that City
if left to him self. to the proper exercise of his own powers 6

The proper philosophical quest lay in trying "to discern
the outlines of that City." In this regard, it was particularly useful to turn to civilizations that not only had not
yet heard the Word of God but also had not yet begun
to philosophize or at least to acquire that detached and
skeptical frame of mind which is often taken for the
philosophical. At the end of the same work, Strauss
wrote:
For what is "first for us" is not the philosophic understanding of
th e City but that understanding which is inherent in the city as such .
in the prephilosophic city. accord ing to which the city sees itself as
su bject and subserv ient to the divine. . . Only by beginni ng at this
point will we be open to the full impact of the all-important question
which is coeval with philosophy although philoso~hers do not frequently pronounce it -the question quid sit Deus.

In referring to pre-philosophic or "natural" cities such
as those of pre-Platonic Greece, the trickiest part was to
discern just how and to what extent they saw themselves
as "subject and subservient to the divine."
Thus in Thomas' case, according to Strauss, his concern with Christian revelation prevented him from
being a true philosopher. His faith had already provided him with the answers to the questions he r aised .
In developing his objections to Thomas ' appro-ach,
Strauss pointed out how Christianity's treatment of its

6

Leo Strauss . quoted in James V . Schall . " Reve lation. Reason and
Politics." Gregorianum, 62. no. 3 (198 1). 495-496.

7

Ibid., no. 2 (1981 ), 349.
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sacred doctrines has been very different from that of
the Jewish and Muslim traditions, for Jews and Muslims both understand revelation, the Word of God, as
the perfect law, as an all encompassing social order
destined to govern not merely men's actions but their
thoughts and opinions as well.
As a consequence, there has resulted in both these
traditions a tendency to simply apply the law, a law that
cannot be questioned, and of imposing order, a social
order that cannot be challenged. While possessing something of this strict legalism, Christianity has differed in
being, of all the religions in the world, the only one to
have understood its sacred teachings as a creed, as a set
of dogmas to be believed in . It is this credal character
that has influenced Thomas' concept of natural law.
More specifically, it has made it, according to Strauss:
(a) too universal; (b) too unambiguous; (c) too compelling; and (d) too theological.
Strauss' first criticism of Thomas is that his concept
of natural law is too universal in the sense of being too
purely rational and too extensive. For Thomas, natural
law was really nothing else than man being rational.
An instance of it is provided every time man rises to
examine any particular in the light of universal reason.
Although there were differences in how they proceeded,
a botanist and a magistrate both sought the law of nature, both sought to discover the universal in the particular case before them. For Strauss, however, the critical discussion of legislation and social policies should
be less scientific, and should be grounded more in customs, traditions, and a common-sense understanding
of things, in other words, in what every man can experience for himself, without the help of any scientific
training or special knowledge. The philosopher's role
is not that of formally deducing certain conclusions
from universally valid first principles. Rather it is the
more informal and substantial role of simply questioning what most people take for granted, helping to clarify the issues, and perhaps pointing the way to a solution.
Strauss also objected that Thomas' natural law is
meant to cover the full range of human activity: deeds
done in private as well as in public. For Strauss, man's
concern for what is right and lawful should be focused
on man's social life in public, where what is done can be
witnessed by or made known to others, and where men
can be held accountable to other men.
Strauss' second objection to Thomas' teachings is
that they betray none of the ambiguity that normally
characterizes moral dilemma. Public discourse and ,
even more, public decision-making should be the resu lt
of a certain amount of agonizing, of interior deliberation , of weighing the merits of each particular case, and
not, as it so often is, the automatic application of a universal law. The use of right reason may be an appro17

We might note that to speak of natural right, as Strauss does, is not at all the same as speaking
of natural rights. The latter Is a spurious objectification and universalization of the former.

priate way of describing how a mathematician arrives
at a correct solution, but it does not do justice to the
doubts and obscurities that plague complex social and
political issues. General statements on these matters
should be advanced cautiously and with an eye out
for exceptions.
For this reason, Strauss prefers to speak of natural
right, i.e. the determination of the right course of action
in a particular set of circumstances, rather than of natural law. It is not always clear what is the right course
of action in a particular set of circumstances, whereas it
is relatively easy to cite a universal law or maxim, which
admits of no exception. It should be noted that to speak
of natural right, as Strauss does, is not at all the same
as speaking of natural rights. The latter is a spurious
objectification and universalization of the former.
Strauss' third objection to Thomas' teaching is that
he has given it a compelling force that it does not really
possess. For Thomas, insofar as a law is reasonable or
just, it draws from the eternal law, that divine wisdom
directing all of nature, the power to bind in conscience.
For Strauss, synderesis, i.e. our moral sense, which
resides in all humans and habitually informs us that
good is to be done and evil avoided, and conscience,
which dictates what is to be done or not done in order
to act in agreement with our moral sense, do not properly belong in the public forum. It is only man's reason
which is suited to pronounce on public issues. Yet by
introducing the notion of conscience, Thomas gives his
pronouncements a compelling force which they would
not have if they were simply advanced as reasonable
arguments. Scientific proofs may be compelling, the
word of God may be compelling, but a political stance
would lose its proper character were it ever to become
something before which we had no choice but to submit.
Strauss' final criticism of Thomas' concept of natural
law is that in fact the natural dimension just about
vanishes, at least in properly human affairs, before the
sublime rationality of the external law and the inner
direction of the divine law revealed by God. Concerns
of a philosophical nature are abandoned by Thomas
too early for concerns of a properly theological nature.
It is legitimate to postulate that natural reason itself
recognizes the insufficiency of man's natural perfection,
that man has a natural desire for fuller knowledge,
which leads him to a desire for knowledge of God, and
which even prepares him for receiving the word of
God, but it is going too far to arrive at public decisions
on the basis of a particular definition of the nature of
God or of man's relationship to God. Too quickly, according to Strauss, we are brought to the question of
man's supernatural perfection, which is the enjoyment
of God, a perfection which cannot be attained by the
state.
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As a resu.lt, according to Strauss, the concept of "the
best regime," which was central to public debate in the
ancient world, has lost its original meaning. Originally
the best regime meant the best possible civil constitution. The natural perfection towards which reasonable
and virtuous men worked was the improvement of civil
society, aware that if it could be perfected in speech it
could never be perfected in deed.
But with the development of Christian doctrine, the
best regime became the absolutely good regime, the
heavenly city of God or its secular surrogate. Of course,
even for the ancients, man and his city gained their
dignity by what transcended the city (i.e., philosophy
and intellectual excellence). However, the call for reasonable men to work towards the attainment of the best
civil constitution lost its urgency for Christians. The
important thing is to save one's soul and thereby gain
citizenship in the absolutely good regime of heaven.
In summary, Strauss, speaking from a classical standpoint, had argued that Thomas and the Catholic tradition in general, while being alone for a long time in
keeping alive a tradition of philosophical inquiry rooted
in man's fundamental in-self-sufficiency, nevertheless
have blended it with a credal spirit, which itself is a
blend of the legal and scientific, that is not in keeping
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We can see that Thomas' rationality is balanced by an awareness of the importance of
preserving the given texture, made from the fibers of custom, of a particular social fabric.

with the philosopher's quest for wisdom or even with
the reasonable man's efforts at improving civil society.

There, briefly sketched, are the outlines of three
distinct traditions- the neo-Catholic, the neo-Calvinist,
and the neo-classical-each with its own philosophical
assumptions, each with its own practical political results, and each capable of standing in radical opposition
to the many variants of secular humanism which have
sprung from the Enlightenment. Whether one chooses
to make as one's starting point the providence of nature,
the Bible, or the archetypal constitution of early civilizations, in all three cases one is referring to a "law and
order" outside of one's own mind and make-up and before which, it is assumed, one should comply, quite
apart from the laws of the particular society one happens to be born into.
As much of the presentation of these three traditions
was done by way of criticism of Thomas Aquinas, it
would seem only fair, before concluding this paper, that
at least a partial response be made to the criticisms
levelled against him.
The first thing to notice is how, to a certain extent,
Dooyeweerd's and Strauss' objections cancel each other
out, or at least how Thomas' position so clearly occupies
a middle ground between Strauss' attempt to recapture
something of the purity of the ancient Greek philosophical spirit, and Dooyeweerd's attempt to recapture something of the uncompromising Biblical religious spirit
of the Reformation.
A second point about Thomas' thought, one which
could not have been gathered from the criticisms above
and which brings Thomas' thought closer to our common-sense understanding of conservatism, is the importance that he attaches to custom. As he says at one
point, "the very fact of change in the law is, in a certain
sense, detrimental to the public welfare. This is because,
in the observance of law, custom is of great importance."
And further on he says "custom has the power of law, it
may annul law, and it may act as the interpreter of
law."8
One could almost construct a case for Thomas' concept of natural law being, in effect, customary law. This
is so first, because Thomas' concept of natural law comprises all those natural, pre-rational inclinations in
man, which he shares with sub-human species; second,
because actions that are frequently repeated and verified, as customs are, appear in effect to result from an
interior movement of the will and a judgment of rea-

son; third, because among human laws those that are
most clearly derived from natural law are not the civil
laws of a state, which are determined to a large extent
by particular circumstances, but the customary laws, the
jus gentium, governing the relations between nations;
and fourth, because of the innate authority of customs,
because people naturally observe customs. For that reason, Thomas says, a generally accepted custom, however
unimportant it may be in itself, should never be set
aside or changed by legislation unless the benefits that
are to result are such as to compensate for the harm to
be done. As we can see, Thomas' rationality is balanced
by an awareness of the importance of preserving the
given texture, made from the fibers of custom, of a particular social fabric.
A third and final point to be made in Thomas' defense
is that Strauss and Dooyeweerd seem to have missed
the important role that analogy plays in Thomas'
thought. Thomas is forever using language to indicate
the existence of a transcendent reality, to suggest the
sense of a rational order that is thought of as antecedent
to human consciousness. The use of analogy enables
Thomas to make points about things that cannot be
described in a matter-of-fact fashion, but that can be
experienced and thought about.
For example, in discussing the duties of a king, Thomas says: "Since art is but an imitation of nature, from
which we come to learn how to act according to reason,
it would seem best to deduce the duties of a king from
the examples of government in nature . . . . A king
then should realize that he has assumed the duty of
being to his kingdom what the soul is to the body and
what God is to the universe." And Thomas concludes:
"Such, very briefly, are the points a king must consider
when establishing a city or a kingdom, and they can all
be arrived at by analogy with the creation of the world."9
In other words, Thomas' concept of natural law is not
only or primarily a concept but rather an idea. It is not
simply a logical category, the result of total abstraction,
of disengaging, for example, a universal law from particular human laws according to a scale of increasing
generality, arriving at natural law and finally at eternal
law as the all-inclusive supreme category. Rather it is
an intuition, the result of a partial abstraction, of intellectually grasping something both in its unique contingent character and in its participation in a transcendent order. Thus does Thomas' teaching allow for
the relative autonomy and intrinsic merit of human
law-making while at the same time suggesting how it
can be illuminated from within by the idea of a higherthan-man-made law and order.

8 Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I a Il ae. Question 97 . in Selected Political Writings, pp. 143-145 .

9 Thomas Aquinas. On Pn·ncely Government, ch apters 12-13 . in
Selected Political Writings, pp. 6 7-71 .
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America the Hypervisual
0 Say Can You See?
William E. Meyer, Jr.
America is long overdue in defining, precisely, its
core-character-that which provides the heat for our
"melting-pot." This is a task which the specialist in the
arts or sciences is ill-equipped to perform, his narrow
field unable to grasp the whole picture. It is certainly
not a task for American philosophers or clergy to attempt, for there has been no real philosophy or religion
indigenous to our culture. The poet is apt to be too
florid; the magistrate, too civil. To find precisely the
right person to gauge our situation requires the happy
chance merging of the insider/outsider/believer/disbeliever/lover/hater. For better or worse, that individual
is I. This is not to brag but to reveal my own dilemma.
In order for me to understand my culture I have had
to fa ll , like a serendipitous spore blown by the wind
from an academic pod, onto the microscopic slide of
some practical intelligence. What I have learned on my
journey and upheaval is simple enough to formulatebut difficult in the manner in which it pervades our cultural consciousness. It is the simple fact that, in America, the European ear has been killed by the eye, the
word has been dominated by the sight, and the expression has to play second fiddle to the vision. Americans
simply don't see like other people do. I shall have something to say, too, about our minorities a little later on;
but they have been radically altered by their contact
with our American sight-getst, our "0 Say Can You See"
hypervisual ideal.
I think you can begin to see why this "visual bias" is
not a welcomed concept for those ensconced in academia, especially those who count on the inviolability of the
word or logic for their livelihood and peace of mind. For
the American visual ideal posits the following antiverbal, anti-cognitive stance: seeing is saying, the highest kind, but saying can never truly rival seeing as the
highest ideal. What I am here going to do is trace this
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hypervisual happenstance through a variety of "standard" and "popular" channels: Only by such a "panoramic" approach can I hope to nudge a few of you off
your verbal shelves and into the soup of our visual melting pot, our eye-iconoclasm. If, however, you prefer
your "liberal thinking" unchanged, I suggest you drop
this piece and go and watch a little television instead.
First, in order to garner any credibility at all with a
few daring members of our American Oxfords, under
the sway of English lyricism or Gadamer's prejudice
that we "think with words" or Heidegger's verbal citadels, let me indicate how our American authors, particularly our literary figures, being the closest to the
"big picture" of our society and its values, have intuited
the great hypervisual American revolution occurring.
With that academic chore accomplished, and the critical
sharks fed, perhaps I can be free to explore a good many
more facets of our popular culture-and beyond to
comments on race relations, politics, and foreign policy.
The implications of the American Visual Revolution
are immense; perhaps that is why we have always pretended not to see that our traditional emperor, the word,
has no clothes.
Our forefathers, the Pilgrims, believed they were
sufficiently armed, at least spiritually and with the
Word, for whatever they might encounter in the New
World. In fact, however, they were not; for what they
could not have foreseen, coming from the well-worn
corridors of Europe, was the demand to see and see
some more. William Bradford, for example, writes of
the ocular shock of the first arrival: "What could they
see but a hideous and desolate wilderness, full of wild
beasts and wild men?" Of course, we know that soon this
terror turned to adoration for the beauties of America,
"from sea to shining sea." It is worth pointing out here,
too, that the Puritan religion brought with it an exacerbating visual thrust, as the religious were expected to
live always under Providence or the Almighty Eye of
the All-Seeing God.
In a famous sermon of the day, Thomas Hooker's "A
True Sight of Sin," the divine exhorted his people in
terms which were to become paradigmatic for the American cultural and aesthetic ideal: "It's one thing to say
sin is thus and such, and another thing to see it to be
such." Hooker knew that the experience of the "eyewitness" was far superior to that of the man who "quietly
reads the story in a book by his fireside." In our evening, Channel 12 "Eyewitness News," we continue to
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validate Hooker's ideal.
From Jonathan Edwards and his "enlightenments"
out in nature, "looking up on the sky and clouds," to
Poe's obsession with the "larger than usual eyes" of his
heroines, to Melville's crew "skinning their eyes" for
the speck on the horizon, the white whale, to Hawthorne's peeking, peering, veiled ministers, we find the
continued preoccupation with the visual revolution
underway. Emerson is one of the most important
sources here, despite the terrible reaction most readers
have to their early introduction to him.
Emerson knew that the quintessential American was a
"transparent eyeball," that the "American scholar" was
the "world's eye," that our age was "ocular," that "time
is optical," and that the looked-for poet who could gauge
our "incomparable materials" must be "the genius in
America, with tyrannous eye." Emerson's notebooks
are filled with such quotes as "educated by a moment of
sunshine" or "that which others hear, I see" or "the eye
is final; what it tells us is the last stroke of nature. Beyond color we cannot go." Emerson knew that the
"courtly muses of Europe" could not adequately account for his New World experience: "When I see the
daybreak I am not reminded of these Homeric, or Chaucerian, or Shakespearean, or Miltonic pictures"; he
could denounce "Pope and Addison and Johnson" who
write "as if they had never seen the face of the country."
But Emerson, for all his enthusiasm for our cultural
visual bias-what he called our "more than average delight in accurate perception"- also knew that there
were certain very important dangers associated with
self-definition by the eye and not the ear or word. He
knew that "perception is not whimsical, but fatal." And
he jested with the literary class of his day about something that, deep down, he must have realized could
come true. He asked them, "Do we fear lest we should
outsee nature and God, and drink truth dry?" It is very
important to remember that Emerson's infamous optimism had been tempered by some awareness of what
Melville called the "power of blackness." But, at his
best, Emerson thrived on our New World eye-euphoria:
"Look, look, old mole! straight up before you is the
magnificent sun!"
I shall conclude this literary review by simply skimming over key works of those important American authors who realized the change occurring. Emily Dickinson, calling it our "very Lunacy of Light," could sum
it up as '"How shall you know?'/ Consult your eye!"
Stephen Crane could fill his works with eye-oriented
color experiments, from The Red Badge of Courage, to
"The Blue Hotel," to "The Bride Comes to Yellow Sky,"
to the Black Riders. F. Scott Fitzgerald could set up as
the deity over our "valley of ashes" the optometrist,
Dr. T. J. Eckleburg, who broods down from a huge
billboard with retinas "one yard high." T. S. Eliot could
insist in his famous notes on The Waste Land that what
the "spectator" Tiresias "sees is the substance of the
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poem." Hemingway is always declaring, of his famous
stripped-down style, that "I only know what I have
seen." And Flannery O'Connor's grotesque American
saint, Hazel Motes, screams out, "What you see is the
truth! .. I've seen the only truth there is"; thence he
goes to apply lime to his hypervisualized eyes and
blinds himself. We might note here, too, in passing that
the American novel or story prefers to end with a striking visual scene or description-with the ship going
down or the woman nursing a starving man in a boxcar-rather than with the "talky" denouements of British fiction and their frequent moralizings or comments
on domestic or cultural virtues.
With that background and buttressing behind us,
what we really need to do is to explore the presence and
ramifications of the American "visual bias" in other,
more immediate walks of cultural life. In the first place,
there is that "popular culture" which touches us all
more than we care to admit. Here, our national anthems
shout, "0 Say Can You See" or "Mine Eyes Have Seen
the Glory" (or my Texas "national anthem" begins,
"The Eyes of Texas Are Upon You"-and, Calvinistically, "You cannot get away"); our national seal sports
an "eagle-eyed" American eagle, possessing 6X vision
and also, obversely, a mystic eye upon a pyramid; our
famous harbor statue holds up a torch for all the world
to see; and our "Miss America," that to which we give
our very name, is surely a visual and not primarily a
personal or cognitive or even "talent" phenomenon.
Here, it is no accident that our best-known poem, Kilmer's "Trees," begins with the anti-verbal, visually
biased lines, "I think that I shall never see/ A poem
lovely as a tree." Nor is it accidental that our "Home on
the Range" desires, above all else, the absence of "cloudy
skies" and "discouraging words." Our video-mania, our
penchant for video-rock, for monogrammed T-shirts
and myriads of touch-up paints for cars-this is just the
tip of the iceberg as it moves through American cultural waters.
I'm afraid, too, when our popular songs tell us to
"Look at me" or "No one's so blind as he who just won't
see" or "Baby, do you love as good as you look," they
are a good deal more profound than anything mentioned in academic analyses. Perhaps Pink Floyd's admonitions in "The Wall"- "Teacher! leave those kids
alone!" and "We don't need no education"-have a
good deal more to do with the perceptive Emersonian
dictum, "Educated by a moment of sunshine," than any
pseudo-American-Scholar would wish to admit. We may
scoff at the manner in which the Oil of Olay is sold on
television, with the song, "The First Time Ever I Saw
Your Face," crooning in the background; but this is the
quintessential American "truth and method."
If one becomes involved in even a casual search
through American magazines and newspapers, one soon
becomes amazed at the prevalent reminders of the
American Religion of Vision at work. A January issue
of Life has run a huge "The Year In Pictures," which is
0
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probably the most acute means of digesting for our
hypervisual society. Or Time has run a gala feature on
rock videos, entitled "Sing a Song of Seeing"- a title
that would have immensely pleased Emily Dickinson,
who knew we inhabited a "New Circumference" where
vision was "Better than Music!" Add to that a "piece" by
John Cage where one takes a picture of a piano on stage,
and you have an excellent clue as to the direction of the
modern American sight-geist.
Once, while on that most American of pastimes,
"sight-seeing," in the Rockies, I picked up a hitch-hiker
from Denmark and we began to talk about our different
cultures. On the topic of television news, he informed
me that the Europeans spent a good deal more time
"talking," the newscasters seated facing the audience,
whereas he was impressed with the American hurry to
go from "tell" to "show," to zoom in on events from Inaugurations to sleeping kittens. Esquire recently ran an
essay on the CBS Evening News, and it supported this
hypervisualist theory completely. Dan Rather insisted
that the broadcast be built around a "doctrine" -stories
that "touch off tiny sunbursts of thought" in the viewers.
Emerson speaking of being educated by a "moment of
sunshine," or Jonathan Edwards describing the "flashes
of lightning" experienced by the American "visible
Christians," would have understood Dan Rather as a
cultural descendant in his flashing "theory of moments."
Here, too, we might mention Rather's famous forerunner, Walter Cronkite. In an essay entitled, "Cronkite's Star Fading in New Roles?", one news analyst
lamented the fact that this famous anchor man was
"coasting through semi-retirement in a mini-sub"- in
hosting the series, Universe-and merely "pointing
out the window at fishes that glow in the dark and saying, 'There's another one."' What this critic did not realize was that Cronkite was simply being a good American, showing instead of telling. A recent essay in the
Texas Monthly candidly admits, "the news biz" is "show
biz." I emphasize show biz.
Or if we look into the world of science, we find that
Jonathan Edwards' premonition that "telescopes" are
harbingers of the "heavenly reign to come" has attained
a kind of fruition at Cal Tech where "the most detailed
picture yet made of the center of our Milky Way" is
offering clues as to the nature of matter or "1 ife" itself.
Or, on the other end of the spectrum, Hooker's command for us ·to engage in microscopic "self-scrutiny"
and "a true sight of sin" is being fulfilled by American
inventor Roy John , who has produced "a computer that
peers into a brain to tell a surgeon when things are
going wrong," that provides a computer-generated
"picture" on a television monitor. Or psychologists are
carefully scrutinizing eye-movements in a California
lab in order to "reveal thinking and feeling." Here,
Emerson could have told them : "The eye is final; what
it tells us is the last stroke of nature." Moreover, the
implications for psychotherapy in a culture based upon
vision, not language processes, are immense. The long
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and tedious sessions, over periods of years, of the classic
Freudian verbal-association process may be less than
adequate for patients suffering from hypervisualization,
not "parental conflict."
A newspaper article on cosmetic medicine, "Surgery
Lifts Face, Spirits," also brings to mind the excessive
amount of time, money, and energy Americans spend
on "looking good." A husband may truly believe, and
influence his wife to believe, that "silicone breast implants will save our marriage." Moreover, in a society
where the first advice on obtaining a job is "personal
appearance," one cannot help but wonder if the high
divorce rate in America is not greatly tied to the cultural ideal of "love at first sight" or "clothes make the
man ," to the exclusion of actual talks between prospective mates. The ordinary courtship ritual in America,
of going to see a movie, followed by hamburgers and
heavy petting in the dark, is perhaps a societal conspiracy buttressing the accepted hypervisualist code.
And in even deeper waters, one cannot help but ask
if our racial problems, our problems with "colored people" of all hues, are not intimately tied to this appearance code. Emerson's assertion that "beyond color we
cannot go" may be of greater analytic value than the
sociological profiles of Black or Yellow or Red or White
Americans' living conditions and economic marketabilities. All this may sound very simplistic to the academician; but so does E=·mc2 today, too.
We might also mention here that the individual wishing to become a writer or "word-smith" in America must
be prepared to assert the supremacy of vision over expression, Hemingway over Shakespeare. A recent essay
in The American Scholar, giving advice to the would-be
published author, insists that his piece must first of all
"catch the eye of an editor." Or the cover of The Writer
tells the budding novelist or short-story writer to "visualize the last scene first." Time and time again, in my own
experience with poetry editors, I hear the same requirement that the Imagists made: "Be visual"-not philosophical or sonorous.
Finally, one cannot help but wonder at the worldwide ramifications of an American policy based upon a
hypervisual idealism. To what extent do we become
"ugly Americans" as we insist upon the same "clean,
well-lighted place" among other lands as Hemingway
intuited within our own? To what extent do we butt
heads against other cultural ideals that may be more
verbo-religious or "traditional" or "underdeveloped"
according to our visual biases? When Graham Greene
entitled his book The Quiet American he was also indicating the sharp focus of this silent man, like Cooper's
Natty Bumppo or Hawkeye, scanning the far horizons
of the plains. Moreover, the fact that, as one newspaper
editorial knew, "ours is a mercilessly self-examing society" may lead us to assumptions and actions far in
excess of anything the Puritan fathers foresaw in their
obsession with "A True Sight of Sin" or "America, the
Beautiful."
Cl
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Actors in the
Audience
Richard Lee
It was intermission, half-way
through the play in the theatre and
our chocolates in the lobby, when
the conversation turned ominous! y
toward the differences between
American and English acting. When
it further turned toward an argument over which was better, I offered to go for vanilla ice creams.
Returning too soon, I faced an Anglo-American debate in full heat.
"English acting is better because the
actors are more widely trained in
repertory, more deeply trained in
the classics, and more versatile in
radio, TV, film, and theatre." "No,
American acting is better because
the actors are more intensely trained
in 'The Method,' more intuitively
trained in disinhibiting therapies,
and more natural in the international medium of film." Noises off
Alarum.
The arguments were not arguments, as far as I could tell, for the
palpable differences between English and American acting do not
argue one is better than the other
any more than chocolate is better
than vanilla. About all I could diplomatically offer was the warning
that the curtain was rising on the
second act and the Anglo-American
alliance must be quickly patched if
we would return to the play together.
Enter England and America with attendants. Flourish.
That non-argument later opened
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up this topic for my diary, namely
the relationship of national audiences to their own actors. If we shift
the spotlight from the actors to the
audiences we might discern why the
English and Americans prefer different kinds of acting and discover
the largely unconscious norms by
which they judge those differences
better and worse. To that end we
might well begin by noting that each
national audience itself acts in its
own dramatized society and represents itself to itself in a variety of
rites and rituals every day. At an
ethereally high level of generalization we might observe that England
tends to dramatize society for the
individual while America tends to
dramatize the individual for society.
That means in England group
rituals tend to dominate the dramatization of society. These ritualsincluding church, chapel, court;
council, school, army, union, club,
gang, pub, and the nation itself in
the royals-find a lively part for
each individual to play. He is indeed often socially supplied with
costumes and props, entrances and
exits, and, very importantly, applause for a good show. A very small
country is dramatically enlarged
every day in larger and larger group
rituals until every subject can see his
role, and even the most eccentric
Englishman has a ritually elaborated
sense of where he belongs.
Americans should not read here
an oppressive class society, for the
middle and upper class rituals can
be impossibly tedious and the working class rituals quite lively. Dress- ·
ing the colors for a Boy George concert might be more invigorating
theatricality than dressing the whites
for cricket.
In America, on the other hand,
individual rituals tend to dominate
the dramatization of society. Even
the most ordinary American busily
presents himself in everyday lifeself-made, as he thinks, to sell himself-and those who present themselves extraordinarily well may
temporarily flood a market, win an
election, create a cult, or at least define their own space. American so-

ciety is dramatized by the charismatic, the celebrity, the latest winner, even the criminal loner, and
most group rituals in America are
pretty tepid affairs when they are
not embarrassing.
The English should not read here
an anarchically atomized society,
for there can be overpowering conformity generated by competitive
individuals eager to please while
seeking their main chance. Americans, like their Cabbage Patch dolls,
try to be like one another in their
individuality.
Of course England and America
both provide for individual and
group rituals in the daily dramatization of their societies, but the mix is
different. That difference may account for some of the differences in
English and American acting and
part of the reason why the different
national audiences judge those differences better and worse. When the
English come out of their dramatized society into the theatre the
better actor may seem to be one who
does not dramatize himself but his
role, acts in ensemble with the rest
of the cast, and on great occasions
in great roles can express the very
soul of the audience. To Americans
the better actors may seem to be certain star personalities embodying
various fantasies of individualism
or on great occasions that actor
whose intensity of performance so
blurs the line between art and life
that it expresses nothing so much as
his own overwhelming self upon his
evaporating role.
England and America get the actors they prefer, perhaps need, and
probably deserve. England does
make better chocolates and America better vanilla ice creams. M~an
while, if we remember that the different national audiences are themselves actors in the daily dramatizations of their societies, we might
guess why they judge the difference
between English and American acting better and worse. In judging the
actors on the stage and screen the
actors in the audience are judging
the actors in themselves. Exeunt
omnes. Tattoo.
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The Nation

In the Middle
Gail McGrew Eifrig
O ne of Meg Greenfield's columns
in Newsweek this winter bears some
attention and some reflection here.
Entitled "Sometimes We Have to
Choose," the piece announces the
author's growing dissatisfaction with
"intractably centrist positions." Responding to her own uneasiness with
a fashionable middle ground ,
Greenfield asserts that · "centrism
has in fact become the secular religion of the governing classes."
She defines the position of centrism as one in which the person actively seeks to occupy a middle position between any two sides, no matter what those two sides might consist of. "Philosophical centrists,"
she writes, "may be seen as people
who have committed themselves to
flocking to this place on grounds
that there is something morally virtuous and politically responsible
about residing there."
Not so, according to Greenfield,
whose pragmatic but effective prose
moves on to an indictment of the
position she has defined. Surely the
person who opts for the mid-point
has allowed someone else to set the
terms for his own position, since
"whoever defines the extremes or

Gail McGrew Eifrig teaches English
at Valparaiso University and is a regular
contributor to The Cresset.
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Is it true that political centrism has become
"the secular religion of the governing classes"?
even the sides also determines
where the middle will be." She asks
whether, in fact, the committed
centrist has neglected to do his own
thinking, has abandoned the necessity of making hard choices, has
given up responsibility for his own
positions altogether.
The problem she sees with this in
political life is fairly easy to predict.
Both major candidates for the presidency (she's writing in February and
I'm publishing in April , but both of
us figure there will still be two major
candidates for the presidency, Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale)
are what she calls "policy centrists."
She points to American policy in
Indochina and in Iran as calamitous
examples of centrism: "some bombing, some pushing, some backing
off, etc.- a kind of reasonable , middle-course, bow-in-every-direction
endeavor that ended, in each case,
in calamity."
Her column ends with a call to
"do things that do not seem to be
consistent and aren't from the point
of view of those keeping score in a
game of traditional Hawks and
Doves." We must, she insists, get off
the center. But the end of the column
is only the beginning of the speculation for those who, habitually or
constitutionally, find the center the
only place to stand.

Taking firm positions on
the Right or Left seems
to me an admirable,
even an enviable, action.
Taking firm positions on the
"right" or "left" seems to me an admirable, a desirable, an enviable
action, but rather on the same order
as figure skating or slam dunking;
I simply do not have the skill. Like
many of my class and generation, I
have paid more attention than perhaps I ought to my elders' admonitions to be tolerant, broadminded,
and universally sympathetic. We
have been well-instructed in the art

of hearing all sides; we know how
to listen for prejudice, for self-interest, and how to fi lter out the indicators of bias. What we find it impossible to do is to take sides.
It is more true than our predecessors and teachers would like to admit that "extremism" has become an
obscenity for us. We have probably
ignored the truth that almost all
achievement has come as the result
of extremism; a commitment to
some goal that is strong enough to
bring it about is probably by nature
something of an extreme. But we
have not lived in the presence of
inspiring personal devotion to goals
for the benefit of all people.
When I look back over my fortysome years , the great achievements
appear to be the result of corporate
or institutional endeavor. Personal
commitment, an extremism of devotion to a cause, seems more often
connected to the weird, the bizarre,
or the downright harmful. Thus,
with notable exceptions of course,
when I think of devotion to the
cause, I tend to think of Eve! Knievel
adding yet another barrel to the
jump, or the local who writes every
week to the paper denouncing someone or other, or even John Gacy or
Jim Jones. Extremism, a dedication
to one point of view, a devotion to
furthering one cause, has an entirely
negative connotation to me. There
have been no Charles Lindberghs, no
Thomas Edisons, no George Washington Carvers in my time.
People of my generation are much
more likely to use a somewhat different phrase when we talk about,
or think about, what to think. We
can "entertain a position." There
seems t<_> me a direct, if negative,
correlation between the degree to
which a subject is truly important,
and the extent to which a person
like me can admit a whole-hearted
belief in a position about it.
We will discuss with great fervor
a number of topics, and take up very
strong positions on various sides. I
The Cresset

Theatre

On the civil rights issue, we took a position, we
cared, we were not sitting safely in the center.
know people who will battle vehemently on the place of sugar in the
diet, on the relative merits of Pavarotti and Domingo, on the evils of
aluminum siding or the benefits of
merit pay. But many of us will not
tell you what we think about nuclear
disarmament, military buildup,
food stamps, block grants, civil liberties, or government aid to education because we cannot know. I am
not claiming this as a virtue; it is a
handicap that those who have to
deal with us should perhaps try •to
understand as well as deplore.

In the shifting ground
of American political
life, the center is for
me the only place left.
To ask how we got this way is perhaps to ask a question only a future
socio-psychologist can answer. As I
said earlier, I think it has something
to do with a training in seeing all
sides, and an inclination, made
stronger by observation of the world
around us , to distrust extremes. Becau se so many of the holders of positions do seem to u s extreme-in
their manner of believing at leastwe tend to identify the sides of any
question as the extremes, and we
want to avoid taking sides in any
issue which threatens to change its
nature as we look at it.
We are not afraid of commiting
ourselves to a position if only it will
continue to remain the way we saw
it initially. Being hurt , even suffering because of adherence to a position is not what we fear. It is that the
issue will metamorphose into something else, that what we picked up as
a banner will explode in our hands.
Let me give just one example of
this fear. For those of us becoming
adults in the Sixties, what was called
"civil rights" was the moral-political
issue on which we were to come of
age. As an issue it was a great and
stirring one; what one thought and
did really mattered. I think for
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many of us the more rigorously political issue of civil rights was blurry.
What mattered was that we did not
want to live in a country where the
law condoned hitting little black
girls who were going to school.
People in my generation made all
kinds of contributions to that cause,
people like Andrew Cheney and his
friends who were killed in Mississippi, and people like J esse Jackson,
who was also learning about moralpolitical issues and coming of age.
We believed, we were whole-hearted,
and if we had not been in on the
struggle from the beginning, that
could hardly be our fault. We took
a position, we cared, we were not
sitting safely in the center.
But the cause and the issue shifted.
Before very long, some of us were
no longer the comrades we had believed ourselves to be. Suddenly we
were the enemy, we were racists,
our efforts in desegregation or busing were the problem, not the solution. By commiting ourselves to a
cause, we had stifled Black initiative,
stripped Blacks of their right to determine their own goals, encouraged
Uncle Toms and Oreos. We were
wrong, and I suppose the most damaging result of this was that we believed it.
Perhaps I read too much into this
experience, partly because the pattern was repeated again in the struggles within our small part of the
Church. But I know that it has a lot
to do with my own paralysis. There
has not been, in my adulthood, any
great issue without a strong element
of moral ambiguity. Doubtless this
has been the case throughout history, though looking back on events
tends to clarify their issues more
conveniently. But when I hear the
call to mo\'e off the center, even
when it is as eloquently put as is
Meg Greenfield's, I realize quite
strongly why I am there. In the
shifting ground of American political position, it is for me the only
place left.
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'Night, Mother, Dad

John Steven Paul
"There is but one truly serious
philosophical problem," writes Albert Camus in The Myth of Sisyphus,
"and that is suicide. Judging
whether life is or is not worth living
amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy."
Two prominent plays currently in
production end with suicides. They
give us the opportunity to rehearse
the ·progress leading to that most
final of human acts . In both 'night,
Mother and Death of a Salesman, the
playwrights have identified the suicide as the single most potent response to a life that has failed to live
up to expectations.
'night, Mother won the Pulitzer
Prize for drama in 1983 and is now
in its closing weeks at the John Golden theatre in New York. Early on in
Marsha Norman's two-character
play about suicide, Jessie Cates announces to her mother Thelma that
she is going to kill herself. She has
posed Camus' fundamental question
for herself, and answered herself
with a simple "No." It is a brief,
small, and uncomplicated drama
during which several clocks in a
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In Marsha Norman's 'night, M other, Jessie Cates is an overweight and unattractive
woman on the brink of middle age for whom things have not tu rned out very well.
cluttered two-room set tick off the
last ninety minutes of a life. There is
some question in my mind whether
Jessie's progression from the declaration to the execution of her intensions is the stuff of tragedy or of
tedium. The movement of the drama
is indeed inexorable, but it is predictable as well.
Jessie Cates is an overweight and
unattractive woman on the brink of
middle age for whom things have
not turned out very well. She has
suffered epileptic seizures since
childhood. She has never been able
to hold a job. Her son is a juvenile
delinquent maturing into a fullgrown felon. Her husband has left
her. After her husband's departure ,
she moved in with her widowed
mother. Now they co-exist in a humdrum, though reasonably comfortable, life. According to Jessie, things
in her life have always fallen down
around her. It is a particularly lucid
metaphor from a woman with the
falling sickness.
Jessie's single objective on this
her last Saturday night is to bring
her life to an orderly end. Her purpose has provided her with the enviable opportunity to tie up the
loose ends, to cheat, as it were, the
infamous thief in the night of his
surprise arrival. Mostly, Jessie wants
to prepare her mother for the exigencies of life alone. When Jessie's
gone, someone else will have to fill
the sugar bowl, put out the trash,
replenish the candy dishes, operate
the washing machine, order milk
and groceries and prescription
drugs, search for extension cords
and flash light batteries, and replace
fuses. She works from a list. But new
items continue to appear.
Like memories. In the past year,
Jessie's seizures have ceased and
her memory has returned. But memory's return is as much a curse as a
blessing. She tots up the accumulated feelings of her life-hurt,
tired, sad, and used-each one
sharpened on the newly-recovered
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whetstone of memory. Her mother's
feelings are interlocking parts of the
same emotional puzzle. Together
they remember the pieces into a disappointing picture. The husband
who loved his daughter better than
his wife; the mother who loved the
son-in-law better than her daughter.
The favorite dog run over by the
tractor; the other woman discovered
with the husband in the barn. The
father who was always "gone fishin"'
even if he was only sitting in a chair
or in a car, hour upon hour, staring
off into space.
After the memories have been
ticked off the list, there remain
some questions. "Did you really love
Daddy? What did Daddy say to you
the night he died?" Jessie asks. And,
in turn, Mama's questions come with
a special urgency brought on by
Jessie's deadline. "Why do you read
the newspaper? Why don't you wear
that sweater I made for you? Do you
remember how I used to look, or
am I just any old woman now? Why
did Cecil leave you?" And, finally,
after thirty years of silence and
seizures, Jessie and her mother begin to peer into the murky gulf of
epilepsy that separates them.
"When you have a fit, do you see
stars or what?" Mama wonders, an
outsider looking in. The insider has
her own question: "What do they
look like . . . the seizures?" Mama
answers in descriptions, confessions,
rationalizations. "It's bubbling, Jess,
not foam like the washer overflowing, for God's sake; it's bubbling
like a baby spitting up." "The horse
wasn't the first time, Jessie. You had
a fit when you were five years old."
"Maybe it's a punishment . . . because of how I felt about your
father." But there is so little time,
and the gulf is so wide and deep. It
is as if the two are trying to build a
bridge from bank to bank before
the rising water drowns them both.
Nevertheless, Jessie and her
mother realize that this night is one
of the most meaningful they have

ever spent in each other's company.
Jessie displays none of the typical
characteristics of the defeated. She
is fatigued, but not depressed. Physically and emotionally, she feels
better than ever. She enjoys a new
self-control. Her mother wonders at
her daughter's unwavering determination for suicide, at a time when
there seems to be so much hope. For
Mama, the evening of sharing questions and answers and feelings and
truths was totally unexpected and
she dares to hope that there will be
more good times like this one. But,
of course, Jessie's determination is
the mother of her strength; her
fresh sense of purpose is born of the
rejection of hope. "It's the next
part," says Jessie referring to her
impending death, "that has made
this part so good."
For women of Mama's age and
experience, however, hope is too
important to life itself to allow it to
be extinguished without a vicious
struggle. And so there are some not
so good parts of the evening. Mama
pleads and begs and shames and
villifies her daughter in an attempt
to get her to "stay" for a few more
years. " It's wrong." " It's a sin.''
"You'll go to Hell. " Mama has some
expectations of her daughter. "When
I wake up, you're supposed to be out
there making coffee and watching
me get older every day, and you're
supposed to help me die when the
time comes."
Her mother's desperate and pitiable reactions to her suicide pain
Jessie. Jessie had expected, so she
says, that she would announce her
intentions, they would go through
the items on the list, and then, while
she was giving her mother one last
manicure, they would relive some
memories and answer some questions. They would sip a cup of hot
cocoa, and, just at the right moment,
Jessie would say, '"night, Mother,"
and go into the bedroom and shoot
herself. But like so many of the
scenes of J ~ssie's life, this one has
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Jessie's own words convinced me. She might have been worth waiting for, but
she never arrived. And what did arrive was not very good comP,any. So what?
failed to measure ·up to expectations.
Her mother has been reduced to a
wreck; the evening has not been an
orderly exit; and their parting will
come with pain, disillusionment,
recrimination, and guilt.
The Jessie Cates of 'night, Mother
ends her life not because of incapacitating illness, or financial woes, or
depression, or loneliness, but because at forty years olq she can honestly say that "smoking is the only
thing I know that is always just what
you think it's going to be. Just like
it was the last time . . .. "None of her
expectations has been realized. Recently, the truth looked out at her
from an old baby picture of herself.
As she looked at the picture she
thought :
that's who I started out and this is who
is left. That 's what this is about. It's somebody I lost all right. it 's my own se lf. Who
I never was. Or who I tri ed to be and never
got there . Somebody I waited for who never
came. And never will. So. see. it doesn't
much matter what else happens in the
world or in this house. even. I'm what was
worth waiting for and I didn't make it.
Me ... who might have made a difference
to me ... I'm not going to show up. so
there's no reason to stay. except to keep
not reason
you compa ny . and that's .
enough because I'm not ... very good company: Am I.

As I came out of the theatre after
'night, Mother, Judge Brack's objection to Hedda Gabler's suicide rang
in my ears. "People just don't do
things like that." And, just as Judge
Brack was rather stupidly wrong, I
would be wrong in raising a similar
objection in the case of Jessie Cates.
No doubt there are people who decide that, after forty years of waiting,
there isn't any use in waiting any
longer.
And perhaps it is not that Jessie
Cates is a false character so much as
she is a negligible character. There
is something very unsatisfying about
suffering through the last moments
of Jessie Cates' life. While she may
be representative; even broadly
representative, of a type of human
being, there is something about
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'night, Mother that ties Jessie down
in the particular," that does not allow
her to transcend the circumstances
of her little house or to reveal very
much about the truth of human experience in general. I didn't care
about Jessie for the short time she
was alive; and I care even less about
her now that she's dead. Her own
words convinced me . She might
have been worth waiting for, but
she never arrived. And what did
arrive was not very good company.
So what?

The thousands of revivals of Death .
of a Salesman since its premier in
1949 attest to the fact that people d o
care about Willy Loman, the salesman way out there in the blue r iding on a smile and a shoeshine. Like
Jessie Cates, Willy Loman ends his
life by his own hands at th e end of
the play, though they are fa tally
wrapped around a steering wheel
rather than a pistol. There are other
similarities in the two tales. Willy
has never been any more th an minimally successful in his job, and his

Now I Am Burrowed in His Lap
having climbed the stairs to find at top the light
beneath his study door and rapped and opened it, oh gratefully, on carpet warm
a~?;ainst my feet and windqws draped this side
of night and smell of books and cigtlt"smoke
still curling white above his green glass-shaded
lamp.
Now safe against his chest, I'm no more
terrified of dark across the hall than
of a friend who waits till stories end,
determined to relive them later, underneath the quilts
where we will ride the roans
all night across a prairie world, urging
them through Butternut's last shallow just as
wind reams in the snow that swirls fenceposthigh before we see the cabin's light
and
venture out at dawn with ax in hand to
bring back ice for tea or, say, our weekly
bath
·
and huddle until April by an
orange fire imd sing whatever comes to
mind when something brown and mean pounds growling
'long the porch
and cheer when Schultz's dray breaks
through at last with stores or packages from
far-away St. Louis
if I close my
eyes and try , not hard at all, to be there
still.
(in memory of Martin Bertram, 1888-1983)

Lois Bertram Reiner
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In Death of a Salesman, Willy Loman is desperately wrestling with his own
dreams, hopes, and expectations. He is battling to keep those expectations alive.
strivings for material comfort have
been frustrated time and again. His
small stature is something of a physical handicap. Most important,
Willy's sons, especially his eldest,
Biff, have not lived up to his expectations, as yet.
Unlike the expectations in 'mght,
Mother of which we get but a dim
impression filtered through Jessie
Cates' dusky disappointment ,
Willy's expectations live and he
lives in the midst of them. It was the
particu lar genius of Arthur Miller's
choice of form that it allowed the
audience to "see inside Willy's
head. " (Inside His Head was an early
alternative title for the play.) Willy's
brother Ben, a rugged individual
who walked into the jungle at age
seventeen and at twenty-one walked
out a rich man, is a component of
Willy's consciousness. When Ben
comes onto the stage, he is Wi ll y's
dream incarnate. Young Biff- "an
Adonis," "a Hercules" -has attained
a similar status: the boy is always
with Willy, and if Biff the man has
yet to live up to the expectation it is
only a matter of time and circumstance. For Willy, Young Biff is a
star of such magnificence that, while
it may be obscured by the temporary
brightness of others, it can never
fade away .
The new production of Death of a
Salesman, which opened up its outof-town run at Chicago's Shubert
T heatre before going on to New
York, is notable for the initially surprising casting of Dustin Hoffman
in the title role. Hoffman is a man of
small physical stature, a feature
emphasized by the casting of supporting players who are much larger than the star. One of these is
J ohn Matkovich , a member of Chicago's Steppenwolf Theatre ensemble and fresh from a great New York
success in Sam Shepard's True West.
Matkovich plays Biff, the man-child
whose knotty relationship with his
father is the centerpiece of the
drama.
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At forty-six , Dustin Hoffman is
nearly twenty years younger than
Willy Loman . The actor's absolutely
convincing portrayal of the older
character begins with his insight
that the essence of the aging process
is the gradual loss of physical
strength, muscle tone, agility, elasticity, and grace. Thus Hoffman's
Will y is a wispy, deflated little man,
the peel of an orange after the fruit
has been consumed. Malkovich, on
the other hand, is an excellent physical specimen. He is no giant, but he
is tall with finely proportioned torso and shoulders, large hands and
forearms . Willy looks at Biff as if his
son were the breath in his body.
When it seems to Willy that Biff may
yet make a success and live up to his
expectations, his shnmken self grows
tight with vitality.
But Biff is determined to shatter
Willy's expectations of him in the
name of truth. "Pop," he cries near
the end of the play, "I'm a dime a
dozen and so are you." "I am not a
dime a dozen ," counters Willy struggling for his personal dignity, which
just now is more important than
life itself. "I am Willy Loman and
you are Biff Loman!" Then there
follows the signal moment of this

production as Biff rushes to the failing, flailing Willy and subdues him
bodily as he bellows:
I am not a leader of men . Willy . and
ne ith e r are yo u . You were neve r a nything but a hard-working drummer who
la nd ed in the ash can like a ll the rest of
them! I'm one dollar an hour . Will y! I tried
seven states and cou ldn 't raise it. A buck
an hour! Do you gather my meaning? I'm
not bringing home any prizes any more.
and you're going to stop wa iting for me to
bring them home!

In this scene Willy Loman is literally wrestling with his own dreams ,
hopes, and expectations. He is battling to keep those expectations
alive. There is no corresponding
scene for Jessie in 'mght, Mother. It
is in his struggling, which culminates in this physical encounter, that

Willy assumes the tragic magnificence that makes us pity him and
fear for ourselves. There is no corresponding struggle in 'mght, Mother.
Jessie Cates has no opportunity to
win our respect or admiration. If
there is an heroic character, it is
Jessie's mother, who is clearly struggling with her own beliefs and expectations.
The contest is over by the time
Marsha Norman 's play opens; the
conflict is resolved. There are no
more issues. Jessie knows that Mama
would have been cared for, even if
she had not allowed that last hourand-a-half for refilling the sugar
bowl and locating the laundry detergent. Jessie's epilepsy was not
induced by anyone's error or neglect, nor is anyone inclined to connect the ex-husband's or the son's
behavior to anything J essie has
done. Jessie is simply tired of waiting. Waiting for what? We don't
know. There is no evidence in the
play that Jessie ever knew what she
was expecting, that she ever believed
in anything. She's not a believer ;
she's not even a sucker. It's sad. It's
pathetic. But it's not meaningful , or
particularly moving.
The stage picture of 'night, Mother
further reduces the resonance of the
drama. The setting is pure kitchensink naturalism . There is a comfortably but messily lived-in sitting
room attached to a small kitcheneating area. The kitchen has been
recently remodeled-perhaps in an
attempt to lift omeone's spirits out
of the mud. Nothing on the set takes
on other than surface meaning, except for the ticking clocks, whose
symbolic importance is amateurishly
obvious. The stage at the Golden is
small, the proscenium arch is comparatively low. Around the opening, a triple-rim frame has been constructed of wood and painted in
stark black and white. The idea that
the frame is meant to convey escapes me, unl ess it is that the life
inside the rim is a needlework sampThe Cresset

To protect his dream,
Willy lays down his life.

Television

ler gone awry: Home Sour Home.
In effect, the frame emphasizes the
smallness and the claustrophobic
quality of life inside and the artificiality of theatre itself.
The setting for Death of a Salesman
is inspired by the famous original
by Jo Mielziner. As in 'night, Mother,
there is a little house at the center
of the design." The transparent roof
of this house opens up to a view of
sky-high tenements that have come
to surround the Loman home. The
sooty grey towers dominate the set,
but their lines thrust upward like
Willy's aspirations. The iron terraces and fire escape ladders, glowing with the reflection of pink and
amber light, perch on the sides of
the buildings.
With a change in the lighting, the
setting returns to its former life as
the nurturing environment of a
younger Willy's American dreams .
The tenements fade away, their windows become stars, and the ironwork
pieces seem to take flight like giant
tracery cranes. A leafy canopy materializes above the Loman house
sheltering the true believers below.
The meanness of the present dominates the picture; it is clear that
things haven't turned out all right.
But it is the vision of a dream able
to be realized that makes the present
meanness so tragically painful.
It is to protect the dream , to ensure the posthumous realization of
his expectation, that Willy Loman
lays down his life. Willy is convinced that the twenty thousand
dollar benefit from his life insurance policy will give Biff that boost
he needs to live up to his father's
expectations. He dies dominated by
the same delusions that dogged his
often miserable life. Yet the tenacity
with which he holds on to his dreams
gives his life value and makes his
suicide a magnificent and shattering
act. For Willy, his life was worth
living and now it is worth giving up,
because the dream itself is worth the
sacrifice.
••
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The Violation of Law
On Television

James Combs
I have oftened reflected that my
fascination with television stems not
from my academic training but more
fundamentally from my childhood.
For in 1950, with the outbreak of the
Korean War (I was nine), my father
was recalled into the Air Force, and
we lived close to Nashville, with
one of the first television stations in
the South. We bought a TV set, one
of those simple and unstable blunderbuss models of the day. And of
course, when you got a set you became very popular with the other
kids around (VCR owners experience the same instant popularity
today). I recall doing something
really mean one afternoon after
school: standing in front of the set
to prevent two kids who had
dropped by to watch from seeing
what was on, as if I owned the signal.
Fran Allison of Kukla, Fran, and
Ollie was my first mass-mediated
crush. Afternoons were spent with
Howdy Doody and Hopalong Cassidy, evenings with Milton Berle
and Sid Caesar and Imogene Coca.
We would even leave the set on
when all that was on was the station
signal (TV didn't go into fulltime
programming for years after that).
Historians of mass communication
have demonstrated what we even
then dimly understood-that TV
had changed our lives, given us a
new window on the world, brought
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new celebrities into our lives, made
old institutions like Hollywood and
radio change, and altered our daily
habits (the TV dinner and TV tray
were quickly invented to cater to
meals before the tube).
Looking at the history of television
now, there is a sense in which TV
was both revolutionary and not. It
was revolutionary in the sense that
increasingly sophisticated technology made TV programming and
news into a new popular art form,
with the visual possibilities denied
radio and immediacy of experience
denied the movies. Yet as TV became institutionalized, like every
large institution it got cautious and
relied on tried-and-true formulas.
Rather than killing the movie industry off, it simply mobilized the
studios into making TV series, and
the studios-long experienced in
such matters-provided the networks with formulaic fare drawn
from the genres of the movies. Warner Brothers, for example, contracted to do the endless numbers of
westerns ABC ran in the late Fifties
-Maverick, Cheyenne, Sugarfoot, and
so on. Indeed, one of the serendipitous consequences of the advent of
television is that it both killed off
and saved the B movie: B movies
disappeared from movie houses and
reappeared in new form on TV -in,
for example, situation comedies.
Too, many popular radio shows
were simply moved successfully to
television- George Burns and Gracie
Allen, Groucho Marx, Jack Benny,
Dragnet, and Gunsmoke (although the
Matt Dillon of radio, fat and bald
William Conrad, had to be replaced
by someone who looked the part,
James Arness). Those who believe
that a kind of media Gresham's Law
always obtains-that bad fare always
drives out good fare-can with some
justification point to the history of
television as Exhibit A. (Indeed,
there is even one school of thought
that says much of television is still
essentially radio: you don't need to
watch it. Soap operas, the argument
goes, are still radio, as are most sitcoms and even Sixty Minutes, where
words are dominant over pictures .
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-If you can close your eyes and still
figure out the story, it's still radio;
if not, it's TV. Star Trek, for instance,
was largely radio; Mission: Impossible was TV.)
Yet as nostalgia buffs kno"l;,.,there
were moments. Some of the CaesarCoca skits are classics of comedy,
and Ernie Kovacs tried some truly
experimental things. There were of
course some of the great teleplays
such as Marty, and highfalutin shows
such as Omnibus and CBS Reports.
Indeed, since they often didn 't know
what they could get away with , there
were often some amusing little inclusions. For example, the first year
or so of Gunsmoke, it was pretty
clear that Miss Kitty ran a rather
sleazy frontier whorehouse, and I
can recall one scene in which it is
morning, and she is belting down
an eyeopener at the bar while complaining about all that hard work
last night. But TV tends to tone
down such things, and after awhile
the dance hall girls disappeared
from the Long Branch, and Miss
. Kitty was as respectable as the Dodge
City schoolmarm.
And then there was Dragnet. Lifted
from radio, the early Dragnet shows
are classics of the imaginative early
use of television. They were filmed,
and indeed appear to have been influenced by post-war Italian neorealism in the movies. They are
gritty, tough, almost cinema verite,
emphasizing the grim routines· of
police work in a big city, and pulling no punches about the kind of
world they must deal with; child
neglect, illegal abortion, bunco, and
other small-time crimes and rackets
are the fare of the show.
Even the famous Christmas show
was about the dark underside-of city
life, cops working the grim beat of
Christmas Eve, and offering little
more than spiritual consolation for
the poor Mexican child who takes
the statue of Jesus for a ·ride in his
charity-donated little red · wagon.
("They're very poor"; "Are they,
Father?" replies Joe Friday. Dumde-dum-dum.) Dragnet, like other
shows, became tame and stale after
a few ·seasons, and when revived in
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the Sixties, preachy; but it pioneered
a use of television tha,t few other
shows have even tried.
This is not to say that the general
dramatic theme of the violation of
the law has not, since Dragnet, been
tried again. As anyone with passing
acquaintance with popular television knows, violation of the laws
of society (and of Whomever Else)
is fundamental to television programming. If there were no crime
in society, it would be necessary to
invent it to fill up the television day
and sell advertising (such an idea
is a kind of mass-media corollary to
the radical argument that crime is
functional for the social order).
But rarely does a cops-and-robbers show emphasize what early
Dragnet did: the nitty-gritty of police
work, such as domestic quarrels,
drunkenness, and petty crime.
Criminals on TV are either crazy
(what would TV do without psycho
Vietnam vets?) or rich and greedy
(but virtually always into drugs or
somesuch, and not white-collar
crimes such as consumer fraud).
True, there are some glimpses of
mean streets and gang violence, but
little exploration of the social roots
of crime. Both melodramatic and
institutional imperatives keep shows
about the violation of the law within
popular bounds: crime is a war between good people and bad people,
and the good people must win.

~

-~~-~~~~~~~~~~~~~---,

That is a bit oversimplified nowadays, but still essentially what shows
about the violation of the law boil
down to. Melodrama is limited in
the subtleties it can admit, and network executives would not be interested in a series based on Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment. So criminals are usually one-dimensional
figures, and the causes and motives
of crime remain the province of
criminologists. Criminals are the
popular representatives of barbarism, a force outside of and opposed to, civilization, and thus are
Other, not Self, not Us, but Them,
irredeemable and in some sense inhuman. This recurrent motif in TV
crime shows likely represents a
popular attitude that makes legal
procedure, leniency and mercy, rehabilitation, and the benefit of the
doubt problematic. If crime is a
manifestation of individual evil,
then it is not a manifestation of social evil, and somehow Our Fault.
But then, melodrama probably
exists because of our deep desire to
pass the buck.
In any case, one thing is clear
from reflecting on the violation of
the law shows since Dragnet: the
violation of the law is not limited to
the criminals. In the war on crime,
cops and other representatives of
Our Side (private eyes, lawyers,
coroners, etc.) regularly violate the
law. Studies of police shows con-
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sistently reveal recurrent violation
of constitutional rights by the police, deliberate omission of rights,
and yes, police brutality and violence. Joe Friday may have been a
tough customer, but he was a stickler for police procedure. But more
and more since, as one study shows,
TV cops blatantly infringe on the
rights of citizens (but "criminals,"
remember, are not citizens) by, for
example, assaulting witnesses, intimidating suspects, or breaking
into residences to steal evidence.
One of the recurrent TV characters (especially since Clint Eastwood's Dirty Harry movies) has been
the maverick cop whose means might
be questioned but who is just,ified
because he or she serves the good
purpose of stopping the barbarians
at the gate. Now a lot of this speaks
to the frustrations (not to mention
ignorance) of TV viewers over what
they believe is the pristine and often
outrageous conduct of the legal
system. The maverick cop and private eye can circumvent such niceties, use direct action, and be as
tough as the criminals; after all ,
being as mean as They are is the
only way to insure that civilization
(?)wins.
But there is something else going
on here, one suspects. One of the
time-honored figures of American
popular culture is the vigilante, the
lone hero who takes the law into his
(or her) own hands for the ironic
purpose of furthering law and order.
The recurrence of this theme is
astonishing: it is as if, for all our '
vaunted respect for law and institutional authority, at some fundamental level we don't believe that
justice will be done without the
"help" of extra-legal vigilante heroIsm.
From the western gunfighter to
the private detective to today's maverick cops, what has been called
"the American monomyth" survives in the endless variations of the
vigilante story. In this variation of
the monomyth , the vigilante defends the community from its enemies without the restraints of law
and institutions, since the "normal
Apn·t, 1984

channels" or "proper authorities"
are helpless against the alien forces
that threaten us. And you know what
that means: violence, unlawful violence, unsanctioned violence, vigilante violence.
American individualism has always had its demonic underside,
and this is all too clear in the vigilante tradition. The Lone Ranger
may have only shot the guns out of
the hands of outlaws, but what law
enforcement agency did he represent? Mike Hammer may wreak
havoc in the criminal world, but
his "justice" is still private. Charley's Angels may be beautiful, but
who gave them the license to kill?
Many such vigilante stories will
make some pretense to legitimacy.
The Lone Ranger takes a moral
vow, Hammer is licensed by the
state, the Angels work for a secret
government agency. But at the core
of the tradition are those tales of
vigilante justice taken by completely
private individuals. From the western to the Death Wish movies, individual vigilantes have reduced justice to vengeance. Groups can do
this too. Witness the success of
NBC's A -Team.
The A-Team is a group of former
Green Berets betrayed by and on the
run from the U .S. Government. To
support themselves, or sometimes
to right a personal wrong, they use
violence and intimidation to realize
rough vigilante justice. But again
no constituted authority hired them:
what they do they do on their own,
and they do it with a vengeance.
According to the National Coalition
on Television Violence, the A-Team
in 1983 averaged thirty-nine violent
acts per hour, more than any other
show on TV. As is typical in vigilante folktales , the legal system and
the police are either inept or corrupt, so the A-Team has to intervene
in order to see that the wicked get
their just deserts. The A-Team is
itself criminal, commits illegal acts,
hires itself out as protection, and
often strikes at legal authority itself;
but in the perverse logic of the vigilante story, this somehow furthers
justice.

Perhaps this goes to the heart of
the matter. J. Edgar Hoover, that
brilliant student of popular culture,
once got into trouble for saying,
"Justice is incidental to law and
order." Perhaps Hoover understood that Americans want justice
over law and order. In any case, he
used popular culture to dramatize
the G-Man as an agent of justice,
while refusing to accept the kind of
real power that would have made
them agents of law and order. It may
be that popular audiences who love
the vigilante story agree with Hoover: law and order are impossible at
best, and usually unjust.
Justice then in the popular mind
becomes the province of symbolic
dramas about agents of justice who
act outside the legal and institutional
restraints of the system. Vigilantes
are free to use violent action, which
many people may feel is the only
way to see justice done. And since
society punishes real vigilante action (although often it is supported
by public opinion), it becomes the
province of the fantasy world of popular culture. But when real vigilante
action-from the Ku Klux Klan to
the Weathermen-happens, one can
see the actual demonic potential of
the popular myth. Students of popular culture are always uneasy that
mass fantasies can be translated into
social and political action on a scale
much larger than the A-Team.
The vigilante tradition in its various popular forms reminds me of
Walter Benjamin's dictum that there
. is no document of civilization that
is not at the same time a document
of barbarism. If it is the case that all
cultural heroism has the demonic
potential for lawless violence, then
perhaps Benjamin's dictum can be
applied to the A-Team in particular
and vigilante dramas in general. If
civilization is represented in popular culture by the agents of law and
order, then barbarism is represented
by the agents of vigilantism. The
persistence of the latter gives us the
feeling that Americans are not totally civilized. It's enough to make you
nostalgic for good old Joe Friday.

••
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The Last
Word
Notes on a Vexation
Dot Nuechterlein
Who's a feminist? One of these
days I am going to have to tackle
that question; given the fierce debate over women's situation during
the past few decades it is not easy to
know exactly how far the definition
stretches and who fits where.
My dictionary states that feminism is "the theory of the political,
economic, and social equality of the
sexes." I myself adhere to that idea
absolutely and wholeheartedly. Yet,
since I do not believe that women
are superior to men, or approve of
abortion in any but the most dire
circumstances, or accept public lesbianism as a political stance, I know
of few self-proclaimed feminist
groups that would welcome me into
their ranks.
On the other hand, I certainly do
not belong in the opposite camp.
The most vocal "we're all right,
Jack" anti-liberationists, who want
no change in the status quo, tend to
be white and privileged. They may
indeed feel quite satisfied with being
taken care of by their fathers and
husbands, but they fail to recognize
that many women are not so fortunate ( ?) and that others do not care to
be so dependent.
Some women have bought the
notion that since women have been
in subordinate positions in most
societies, God must have intended it
that way. Still others have hung on
to the separate-but-equal doctrine
long after it has been proven unfeasible. And then there are those
who are convinced that men really
are better than themselves. Poor
dears.
So I don't agree with either bunch.
As an academic and social analyst
interested in why people think the
way they do I cannot condemn those
whose ideas differ from my own.
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But I am beginning to feel a mite
uncomfortable because in all the
verbiage and propaganda and rhetoric, nobody out there seems to be
. saying what I think .
Our attitudes are largely shaped
by our experiences, and maybe one
of the reasons I have not become
radicalized is that I personally have
never felt very oppressed. But oppression does exist-! have known
women restricted or trapped by
short-visioned parents, obtuse husbands, limited counselors, unfair
employers, or the ignorant societal
philosophy which says "Because you
are female you can/may/should/
must / SHALT NOT do or be or
think or say what you wish."
The same situation exists in our
major institutions. I have worked
within three of them: government
civil service, academe, and the
church. These have been traditionally male worlds , and the willingness to accept and use women's talents has been painfully slow in all
three.
Government has made the most
progress. I was a civil servant in another country where both law and
practice differ somewhat from the
Yankee variety, but it appears to me
that the basis for political equality
of the sexes has been established
similarly in both lands. General
publics may not be quite ready to
vote on any large scale for women
as presidents and prime ministers ,
but within the system women have
many more opportunities than previously to rise in power and influence. This is partly because the law
so decrees and partly because the
structure is so saturated with incompetence and complacency that
any reasonably bright , efficient
comer ought to be able to figure out
how to manipulate things to her/ his
advantage.
Higher education, too, has made
great strides recently. It will be
some time before pay scales, tenure
ranks, and other gaps close; but a

college is, after all, a place where
rationality is one of the prime values,
where objective standards are honored, and where "what you know,
not who you are" is supposed to
matter. Women academics will increasingly achieve their potential
because they are intelligent, creative, and accustomed to multiple
responsibilities, long hours, and
low pay.
But the church? Ah , the church:
she, or rather her spokesmen, will
have a tough time becoming truly
inclusive. Some are better at it than
others. Many of my adult years
were spent in a church body and a
congregation that had few proscriptive policies about women's place.
Those of us with the inclination and
abilities took our turn at being
church president, communion assistant, convention delegate, lay preacher, or whatever was needed. And
our active participation did not seem
to diminish that of the men , either.
(Of course, not everything was entirely equal-! don't recall men organizing church suppers or bringing refreshments to meetings!)
Now, however, I am back in the
other kind of ecclesiastical environment, and let me tell you it is an unpleasant step backwards. Oh, females are urged, even begged, to do
all sorts of things in and for the
church; but there are clear boundaries. The reasons given for why it
should be this way are liberally
laced with God-talk , of course; but
these manmade rationalizations justify cultural practices that are no
more divinely-inspired than the
fact that some of us prefer mustard
on our hamburgers. I do not mean
to trivialize serious concerns, but
the patience grows thin: the very
same arguments against women's
ordination today are the ones we
used to hear about women going to
church without hats.
Well , as I said, one of these days I
am going to have to think about all
of this. But not today.
Cl
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